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Mobile devices can sense several types of signals over the air using different radio 
frequency technologies (e.g., Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, cellular signals, etc.). Furthermore, 
mobile devices receive broadcast messages from transmitting entities (e.g., network 
access points, cellular phone towers, etc.) and can measure the received signal strength 
from these entities. Broadcast messages carry the information needed in case a mobile 
device chooses to establish communication. We believe that these signals can be utilized 
in the context of access control, specifically because they could provide an indication of 
the location of a user's device. Such a “location proof” could then be used to provide 
access to location-based services. In this research, we propose a location-based access 
control (LBAC) system that utilizes tokens broadcasted by IEEE 802.11 (Wi-Fi) access 
points as a location proof for clients requesting access to a resource. This work differs 
from existing research in that it allows the verification of a client’s location continuously 
and unobtrusively, utilizing existing IEEE 802.11 infrastructure (which makes it easily 
deployable), and resulting in a secure and convenient LBAC system. This work illustrates 
an important application of location-based services (LBS): security. LBAC systems 
manage access to resources by utilizing the location of clients. The proposed LBAC 
system attempts to take advantage of the current IEEE 802.11 infrastructure, making it 
directly applicable to an existing ubiquitous system infrastructure. 
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A smartphone is essentially a small computer that can fit in one’s hand. The 
beauty of using a smartphone lies in its ability to perform different functions and allow its 
users to access networks such as the Internet while providing convenience. In the past 
two decades, there has been rapid growth in the number of mobile devices utilized, 
especially with the global smartphone boom. Smartphones took over the wider consumer 
market, and as of 2018 according to the Pew Research Center, 77% of US adults use 
smartphones [50]. Smartphone users send, receive, and generate different types of data 
that can be consumed by functions and services. An example of such data is location 
data. This type of data is used in a location-based service (LBS). 
A LBS is a service that takes the geographical location of a user’s device into 
consideration to provide certain application functionalities or services that are specific to 
a given location, such as ordering a ride or searching for nearby restaurants. LBSs have 
grown rapidly with the increase in the number of mobile devices and are expected to 
grow more among technologies such as the Internet of Things (IoT) and smart cities [46]. 
LBSs allow applications and services to be tailored to a given location, thereby limiting 
the services and/or functionalities a user receives to a physical location. LBSs tie data to a 
specific location where a user's activities happen and where services are offered. 
Location-related raw data can be useful and become a powerful source for data mining, 
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where new information and patterns can be extracted to further improve the LBS or for 
different applications and services. For example, location and shopping pattern data can 
be used to advertise nearby businesses that may interest a user. 
LBSs have various applications; for example: 
1. Navigation: This service helps to locate the exact position of a user's device using a 
positioning system such as the Global Positioning System (GPS). It can also 
determine the best route for users to use to reach their destination. This is 
commonplace with smartphones. Apps such as Google Maps, Apple Maps, and 
Waze, for example, offer exciting features such as traffic conditions, reported 
accidents, and real-time updates to a route to assist users in reaching their destinations 
in the shortest time. 
2. Emergency: One of the most vital applications of LBSs is for reporting emergencies. 
This is typically known as E911. Since LBSs reliably provide a user's location, it is 
easier for emergency services to track a user. Moreover, LBSs are very useful in 
disaster management, where they help to direct resources and to find the safest 
evacuation paths. A well-known example for using LBSs in emergency situations is 
the Amber Alert System, an emergency response system that broadcasts information 
about a missing person across U.S. interstates and highways in a location of relevance 
to the emergency. 
3. Marketing and advertising: LBSs provide organizations the possibility of targeting 
customers based on their geographical location. This can also be used to study the 
behaviors of users and target advertisements that interest a specific group of users 
sharing some common interest. 
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4. Social media: LBSs can add a location element to user-generated content (e.g., 
images), providing context and potentially making it more interesting and relevant to 
social media users. For example, users now can “check-in” and geo-tag photos and 
videos that they post. 
5. Workforce management: LBSs are used in workforce management by organizations 
that employ individuals out in the field or at multiple remote locations. LBSs allow 
employees to manage the business more efficiently by tracking the locations of their 
employees, allocating tasks based on their location, and keeping track of worker 
progress. A prominent example of this is used by shipping logistic companies to track 
customer package shipments to provide expected delivery dates and real-time 
package location information. 
6. Gaming: Hobbies such as geo-caching (scavenger hunt-type games that use real 
geographical locations) have become popular over the last several years. A popular 
game, Pokémon Go, uses the location of players to provide a better gaming 
experience. Players can find Pokémon characters near them by navigating to a real 
physical location identified in the game.  
7. Security: There are many security applications involving LBSs. An important one 
involves controlling access to resources for information security. This is known as 
location-based access control (LBAC). Secure LBSs can help to prevent unauthorized 
access to resources and to enhance a system's information security. In LBAC systems, 
an authorization entity typically verifies the location submitted by a user requesting 
access to a resource, and either grants or denies access to the resource based on the 
location. In general, LBSs make access to resources such as online banking more 
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secure [5]. An example of this is fraud prevention, where LBSs create an extra level 
of security by comparing a user's location to the location of a credit card transaction. 
Suspicious activities are then flagged or the transaction is declined. 
There are many other applications of LBSs. Moreover, LBSs are becoming more 
common and widespread every day [44]. LBSs are also expected to advance and expand 
more with the recent developments in artificial intelligence, cloud computing, and IoT 
[60]. According to a Technavio report, the global indoor LBS market is going to witness 
a growth of more than 43% by 2020 [59]. As a result, LBSs have been (and continue to 
be) an interest for researchers and organizations. 
In order to have an efficient LBS, the location information of a valid user is 
required. Location information can be obtained using different technologies. Most of 
today's smartphones are compatible with more than one location sensing method. Several 
of the most common methods used in obtaining a user's location in LBSs include: 
1. GPS: The Global Positioning System is a radio navigation system that allows users to 
determine their exact location, velocity, and time anywhere in the world. GPS-based 
systems use signals from multiple satellites to calculate a user's position using the 
basic principles of trigonometry. Most smartphones contain a GPS “chip” (typically 
in the form of an integrated circuit). Despite GPS being a very efficient and 
convenient way to obtain a user's location, GPS-based systems have some 
weaknesses when used in LBSs. For example, GPS locations can be spoofed at a 
software level, thereby potentially rendering them unreliable and even insecure in 
LBAC systems. Furthermore, they suffer from performance limitations indoors, in 
that barriers such as buildings significantly reduce line-of-sight to satellites.  
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2. Cellular towers: A user's location can also be obtained through a network of cellular 
towers. A user's location can be determined by simply associating a cellular ID 
received at the user's device from the cellular tower broadcasting it, or by using 
triangulation and/or the angle of arrival (the angle in which the signal arrived the 
cellular tower's antenna). In general, the location obtained using cellular towers is 
more accurate (i.e., location errors are smaller) in urban settings due to the larger 
number of cellular towers located there. The location obtained through cellular towers 
is widely used in the E911 system as a backup to GPS [13]. This can occur if the 
caller's device does not support GPS or encounters GPS failure(s). 
3. Wi-Fi and Bluetooth: Location obtained using Wi-Fi or Bluetooth is typically used 
for indoor applications. Wi-Fi networks usually consist of one or several wireless 
access points that allow devices to connect wirelessly to the network. A user's 
location obtained using Wi-Fi or Bluetooth is usually calculated in reference to a 
wireless access point transmitting a signal or by using indoor maps (which are visual 
representations of indoor geography). Determining a user's location indoors using Wi-
Fi has been the target of several research projects as it is very important for emerging 
technologies such as IoT and robotics. Several techniques have been introduced that 
utilize different principles to calculate the location of devices [43], including the 
round-trip time (i.e., the time required for a wireless signal to travel back and forth 
between a user's device and a wireless access points), and the received signal power 
strength. 
4. Sensors and wireless sensor networks: A wireless sensor network is a network of 
connected sensors that are used to monitor physical or environmental conditions such 
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as temperature, sound, and vibration. In some cases, wireless sensor networks can be 
used to calculate a user's location accurately. Different types of sensor networks can 
be used for this purpose: for example, ultrasonic sensor networks, light (i.e., photon-
based) sensor networks, and others. However, most sensor networks are impractical 
to deploy due to their cost and complexity (they can consist of a large number of 
devices that need to be maintained and synchronized). 
5. Hybrid positioning systems: In hybrid systems, different positioning technologies are 
combined. GPS is typically the main technology in these systems; however, other 
technologies are integrated to provide a way to overcome the limitations of GPS and 
to increase robustness of the overall system. For example, assisted GPS uses 
information from nearby access points to obtain a faster location fix. Hybrid 
positioning systems are increasingly being employed in LBS applications, particularly 
if they need to perform well in urban settings (e.g., to support self-driving cars). 
Indeed, there are a number of ways to obtain a device's location. Consequently, 
location data can be presented in different formats such as: 
1. Absolute location: A device's absolute location describes a fixed point on the earth. 
The most common way to identify the absolute location is by using a pair of 
coordinates (e.g., latitude and longitude). GPS typically provides an absolute location. 
This type of location data needs to be transmitted and stored securely to address 
privacy and security concerns. 
2. Relative location: Refers to a position with respect to a reference point. Relative 
location can be expressed in terms of distance, travel time, or other forms. This type 
of location is usually utilized for indoor applications and can be used to generate 
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location proofs. A location proof is a digital certificate that indicates the position of a 
user at a specific time. Several researchers have studied generating relative location 
indoors using information from Wi-Fi or Bluetooth access points [30]. 
3. Location tags: Temporary keys generated and issued by an authorized entity at a 
specific location are known as location tags. Such tags are used to prove proximity to 
the entity issuing them and usually are valid for a limited time. Using location tags as 
location proof reduces the risk of revealing a user's location if the system is 
compromised since location tags do not carry the user's absolute location. Location 
tags can be installed at the location of interest in the form of QR codes, for example, 
or via near field communication (NFC) where users scan NFC “tags” to obtain the 
location tag. Moreover, they can also be broadcasted via Wi-Fi access points or 
Bluetooth. 
4. Contextual data: This kind of data refers to the data that users can get from their 
surroundings. It can be used as a location proof; however, it must be verified by an 
authorized entity. Some examples of contextual data are the power footprints of Wi-
Fi access points, lighting (i.e., photons), etc. For example, Wi-Fi channel 
characteristics are used for paring two devices [55], and light sensors are used in 
location-based illumination control [29]. 
Location can either be calculated at a user's device or by other nodes in a system 
that can calculate a user's location or verify a user's proximity. As discussed above, there 
are several methods that can be used to obtain a user's location, and these methods vary in 
accuracy, efficiency, and cost. Moreover, they provide different types of location data 
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(resulting in location proofs). Thus, the location method to be used in a LBS depends on 
the LBS and what method fits it the best based on its unique requirements. 
One important use of LBSs is LBAC. In this dissertation, we propose a LBAC 
system that utilizes ubiquitous Wi-Fi access points already in a location to manage access 
to resources. A significant aspect of this work is that the proposed system is unobtrusive 
(i.e., there is zero interaction on the part of users in the system). 
LBAC is an information security methodology that utilizes the location of users to 
control who can access resources. LBAC performs authentication to prove the identity of 
a user and subsequently grant (or deny) permission to access specific resources by 
verifying the user's presence at a distinct location. In order to produce an effective LBAC 
system, the user must present a location proof that verifies the user's physical presence at 
a distinct location. Moreover, an authorization entity must be able to verify the location 
accurately. Based on that result, it grants or denies access to resources. An extension to 
this involves managing which specific resources a user can access based on the user's 
location. It is also important for a LBAC system to be able to limit access to resources 
during the time that a user is physically present at an appropriate location (i.e., 
terminating access once the user leaves). 
LBAC allows for the implementation of location-based security policies. 
Examples of this include limiting access to sensitive data when a user is located at a 
specific location. Furthermore, LBAC reduces the malicious use of information because 
access is limited to specific location(s). For example, bankers have no need for 
confidential customer data outside of their offices; therefore, access to this data from the 
outside is most likely malicious and should, therefore, be prevented. 
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With the increase of LBSs, privacy issues have been raised. Moreover, they have 
become significant with recent breaches to major technology companies such as 
Facebook, Yahoo, and Equifax [20]. A user's location (and a location proof) is sensitive 
information that must be protected from unauthorized access so that it is not misused. 
Privacy is a very important goal when designing a LBS. Generally, there are two types of 
data that are relevant to LBSs that must be kept private: the actual location data and the 
user's personal data. Studying the subject of privacy in LBSs has become important to 
many researchers in order to find ways to maintain privacy and prevent unauthorized 
access to data in LBSs [3]. As a result, various anonymization and obfuscation algorithms 
have been developed to achieve this goal. An example is the use of obscure 
representations of location data to improve privacy [37]. 
In order to have an effective LBAC system, it must be convenient for users of the 
system. This typically includes ensuring that it does not require extra effort from users in 
the system. User convenience is a key factor in the success of any system [39]. It is 
known that complex systems that require extra user effort tend to drive them away [39]. 
However, from a deployment point of view, systems must be affordable, easy to deploy, 
and should not require significant infrastructure (in fact, it is typically best if a system 
makes use of existing infrastructure, especially if it is to be widely used). Building a 
secure and inexpensive LBAC system is essential. 
The importance of LBSs in the present day is clear, with many applications in 
different areas ranging from business to public safety, and security. There are different 
methods that can be utilized to obtain a user's location, and each has strengths and 
weaknesses. The need to have LBSs that do not compromise user privacy and security, 
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and have the ability to verify location claims efficiently and accurately has emerged. 
Building an efficient and secure LBAC system that can be implemented for use in 
different LBSs is the goal of this research. Specifically, this work aims to explore the 
possibility of building a secure, inexpensive, unobtrusive, and robust LBAC system 
utilizing existing ubiquitous infrastructure.  
Today, a username and a password are typically used for authentication. Our goal 
is to add a second authentication factor for more security and to add LBS compatibility, 
in a way that it is secure, unobtrusive for the users, inexpensive and utilizes existing 
infrastructure. To accomplish this, we propose to utilize the current IEEE 802.11 
infrastructure and potentially making slight modifications to existing access points. 
Furthermore, a goal of the proposed system is to continually verify the presence of a user 
in the context of authenticating access to resources. We call the proposed system a zero-
effort system, which means that a user's location proofs are collected and sent 
automatically without adding any extra burden on the user. 
1.1 Technical Background 
A LBAC system consists of two components: a location component that provides 
a user's location for authentication, and an access control component that controls access 
to resources based on the location component provided by the user. In this section, 
necessary background will be covered before we introduce our proposed system in a later 
chapter. 
Access control in information security is the process by which users are granted 
access and certain privileges to systems, resources, or information. In general, access 
control includes identification, authentication, and authorization. Identification refers to 
11 
the process of a user claiming an identity (i.e., “Who are you?”). This is done, for 
example, by providing a username. Authentication is the process of proving the identity 
of a user by verifying credentials that were provided in the identification process (i.e., 
“Are you who you say you are?”). Authorization is ultimately making the decision to 
grant or deny access based on the outcome of authentication.  
The process of authentication can be performed as single-factor or multi-factor. In 
single-factor authentication, one credential is used to confirm a user's claimed identity. In 
multi-factor authentication, multiple credentials are used: for example, a user providing a 
password and a second factor such as a fingerprint in two-factor authentication. Second 
factors include things like security tokens or biometric factors such as a fingerprint, 
voiceprint, or retina scan. Multi-factor authentication adds an extra layer of security and 
prevents attackers from gaining unauthorized access in cases where the first factor is 
compromised. 
A user's location can also be used as a factor (including as a second factor) for 
authentication in access control applications. In this way, access is granted only if a user 
is in a specific physical location. This can be done by having the user provide location 
information manually, through a mechanism on a device (e.g., via an installed application 
on a smartphone), or via a location proof that can be in the form of a key that indicates 
that a user is close to a node requesting authentication to a resource. The authorization 
entity verifies this information and makes a decision to grant or deny access based on it. 
In this work, we explore the possibility of modifying existing artifacts in IEEE 802.11 
access points to accurately provide location proofs for users in a LBAC system. 
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IEEE 802.11 refers to the set of standards that defines communication for wireless 
local area networks (WLAN). Generally, IEEE 802.11 is known as Wi-Fi. The IEEE 
802.11 protocol allows computers to communicate wirelessly with each other. There are 
different versions of the IEEE 802.11 standard: for example, IEEE 802.11a, IEEE 
802.11b, IEEE 802.11g, IEEE 802.11n, and, recently, IEEE 802.11ac and IEEE 
801.11ad. These different specifications primarily represent changes in speed, 
performance, and range. As new Wi-Fi technology emerges, standards are improved and 
released to the public. 
WLANs operate on one of two major frequencies: the 2.4 GHz band or the 5 GHz 
band. A band is a specific range of frequencies that is regulated by a government for a 
specific use. In IEEE 802.11, bands are divided into channels that allow various nearby 
devices to share the same frequency without resulting in (or limiting) interference. The 
2.4 GHz band has 11 channels and is more subject to interference, as it is a general use 
band that is utilized by many other applications such as Bluetooth, microwave ovens, 
baby monitors, cordless (hard line) phones, and so on. In this band, there are only a few 
channels that can be used at the same time without interference. The 5 GHz band has 19 
usable channels. Devices using the 5 GHz band must be able to examine a channel's 
usage and choose one that minimizes interference. In general, the 5 GHz band provides 
faster data transfer rates at a shorter distance, whereas the 2.4 GHz band offers coverage 
at farther distances but may perform at slower speeds. Most of the access points today run 
in dual mode, providing both 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz coverage, simultaneously. 
Data transmission speeds vary based on the version of the Wi-Fi protocol that is 
used. It ranges from 6 Mbps (megabits per second) in IEEE 802.11a to 600 Mbps in IEEE 
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802.11n. The coverage range of WLAN access points varies from a few meters to 100 
meters. An access point's range depends on the protocol used, its transmitter type (e.g., 
antenna type) and its configurations (e.g., antenna transmission power settings). 
In this work, we propose to use existing the IEEE 802.11 access points to 
broadcast meaningful tokens that can be used to generate a location proof. In general, a 
token is a secret key that is used to gain access to a digital resource. Our first step is to 
determine if it is possible to broadcast tokens in the context of Wi-Fi protocol constraints. 
Although there are several ways that we could go about broadcasting tokens, we propose 
to manipulate the beacon frame of network packets in WLANs. Fundamentally, a frame 
is a base unit of digital transmission in networks. The beacon frame is one of the 
management frames in the IEEE 802.11 protocol. It is used to announce the existence of 
a network, and it plays an important role in many network maintenance tasks. Beacon 
frames are transmitted at regular intervals (called the beacon interval), allowing network 
interfaces on user devices to find and identify networks. They also carry any necessary 
parameters for joining the network. Access points are responsible for transmitting beacon 
frames. The area in which beacon frames appear defines the basic service area, which is 
the area where an access point can provide the service of providing wireless access to the 
network. Devices need the information in the beacon frame to be able to connect to an 
access point; therefore, mobile devices must be close enough to access points to be able 
to receive the beacons. In general, the beacon interval of most access points is set to 100 
milliseconds by default. However, it can be adjusted in most access points. Access points 
must schedule beacon transmission at the set beacon interval, but the transmission may 
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suffer some delays to avoid collision with beacon frames broadcasted by other devices 
and access points in the area. 
As shown in Figure 1-1, the structure of a beacon frame in IEEE 802.11consists 
of the following: 
1. MAC (Medium Access Control) header: The MAC header includes source and 
destination MAC addresses. A MAC address is a hardware identification number that 
uniquely identifies each device on a network. The destination address in broadcasted 
messages is always set to the MAC address (FF:FF:FF:FF:FF:FF), which is the 
default broadcast MAC address in computer networks. This forces all other devices 
on the applicable channel of the frequency band to receive and process each beacon 
frame. 
 
Figure 1-1: The structure of the IEEE 802.11 beacon frame [25]. 
2. The frame body, which includes the following: 
15 
a. A timestamp field that is used by a network device to update its local clock. 
This process enables synchronization among all devices that are associated 
with the same access point. 
b. A beacon interval field that represents the amount of time between beacon 
transmissions, and it is used to determine the next time to check for incoming 
traffic in case the device goes into power saving mode, which allows a device 
to switch its Wi-Fi radio unit on and off several times per second to extend the 
battery’s life. 
c. A capability information field that advertises the network’s capabilities and 
requirements to devices that wish to connect to the WLAN. 
d. A Service Set Identifier (SSID) that uniquely identifies a specific WLAN. The 
SSID is simply the name of a Wi-Fi network. Before associating with a 
particular WLAN, a device (known as a Wi-Fi NIC – a wireless network 
interface card) must pair with the SSID of the access point. By default, access 
points include the SSID in the beacon frame to enable functions on devices to 
identify the SSID and automatically configure the NIC with the proper SSID. 
However, most access points have the ability to omit the SSID from beacon 
frames, thereby hiding the network from devices. 
e. Supported rates describe the speeds (in Mbps) that a particular WLAN 
supports, which help devices to stay within speed limits and avoid using 
unsupported rates. Devices can use the supported rate information to decide 
which access point is more suitable for connection. 
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f. A parameter set field that includes information about the specific signaling 
methods to be used when associating with an access point (e.g., the spread 
spectrum modulation technique, which is issued to reduce overall signal 
interference). The beacon frame includes the appropriate signaling methods to 
adapt to the channel's condition and achieve efficient data transmission. 
g. A traffic indication map (TIM) that provides a list of all devices that have 
undelivered data buffered on the access point (i.e., that is waiting to be 
delivered). 
3. A frame check sequence (FCS) provides error detection capabilities. 
Since this work aims to utilize the IEEE 802.11 beacon frame to transmit tokens 
for the authentication of clients to resources, different fields in the beacon frame could be 
modified to carry the token. In fact, several fields may be unnecessary during normal use 
and can be exploited for use in the proposed LBAC system. Access points currently 
available in the market typically transmit power in the range of 16 to 32 decibel 
milliwatts (dBm). A dBm is the power ratio referenced to 1 milliwatt (mW) in the 
logarithmic scale. This scale is used as a measure of power in communication systems 
because of it provides a convenient way of referring to ratios, such as the ratio between 
the amplitudes of a transmitted signal and a received signal. As a wireless signal travels, 















𝑃𝑟 is the power at the receiving antenna. 
 𝑃𝑡 is the power transmitted by the transmitting antenna.  
𝐷𝑡 is the directivity of the transmitting antenna. Antenna directivity is a parameter 
that measures the degree to which the radiation emitted by the antenna is 
concentrated in a single direction. 
 𝐷𝑟 is the directivity of the receiving antenna. 
𝜆 is the wave length in meters. For example, the wave length for 2.4 GHz Wi-Fi is 
approximately 0.125 meters and for 5 GHz Wi-Fi is approximately 0.0625 meters. 
 𝑑 is the distance between the transmitting and receiving antenna in meters. 
As can be seen from Equation 1-1, the power of the received signal at the 
receiving antenna is inversely proportional to the square of the distance that the signal 
traveled. Thus, the received signal strength at a device is consistent with its location in 
reference to the access point. Figure 1-2 shows the beacon information received by a 
mobile device on the campus of Louisiana Tech University. The figure shows Wi-Fi 
access point information obtained in real-time by an application known as Acrylic Wi-Fi 
Home [1]. Information provided includes the access points in range of the device and 
their corresponding Received Signal Strength Indicators (RSSI) in dBm. The application 
collects information about access points scanned by a network device. As can be seen in 
the figure, the RSSIs have negative values. A negative dBm means that a negative 
exponent is applied in power calculations (e.g., 0.1 mW equals -10 dBm is, similarly 0.01 
mW equals -20 dBm, etc.). 
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Figure 1-2: Beacon information from several access points on campus [1]. 
Most of the access points sold on the market contain built-in firmware that allows 
some degree of configuration. Such firmware is typically Linux-based. Linux is a free, 
open-source operating system. It is modifiable by anyone, and variations of the source 
code (known as distributions) can be freely created. The most common use of the Linux 
operating system is as a server (a machine dedicated to providing services to people: for 
example, a Web server that provides Web pages). However, Linux is also used in desktop 
computers, smartphones, network routers, gaming consoles, etc.  
The Linux operating system supports a command line user interface called the 
shell. The shell allows controlling the system via a text-based command line and supports 
writing programs that can be used by the operating system to control parts of the system. 
Bash is an improvement of the shell that extends it. One of the most important tools 
available in the Linux shell is the Secure Shell (SSH). SSH is a network protocol that 
allows strong authentication and encrypted data communications between two computers 
connecting over an open network such as the Internet. SSH allows remote logins and 
supports remote command execution. 
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While it is possible to use SSH with a username and a password, SSH relies more 
securely on public-private key pairs to authenticate hosts to each other. A key in 
cryptography is a variable value that can be used as an authentication factor or to encrypt 
or decrypt a message. Moreover, a key is used in hash-based message authentication code 
(HMAC) functions. A hash is a function that maps data of arbitrary size to data of a fixed 
size. Some well-known examples of hash functions include MD5, SHA1, and SHA256. 
They are essentially math functions that produce a (hopefully) unique hash for arbitrary-
sized data. HMAC utilizes a key along with a hashing function to generate a message 
authentication code that is used for several applications such as verifying the data's 
integrity and generating time-based passwords. In this research, HMAC is used to 
generate time-based tokens, which is discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
1.2 Conclusion 
In this chapter, LBSs, their applications, and different methods to obtain the 
location of mobile devices were discussed. Furthermore, LBAC systems were introduced, 










In this chapter, we survey prior attempts to leverage user location for access 
control purposes. Existing research includes LBAC using GPS, wireless sensor networks, 
Bluetooth, IEEE 802.11, and others. 
2.1 Related Work 
This section provides an analytical overview of the significant literature published 
in the LBAC topic, which is categorized based on the location method used. 
2.1.1 LBAC Systems That Use GPS for Localization 
GPS is the most straightforward way to obtain a user's location on GPS-enabled 
devices. Most smartphones are equipped with GPS. In 2006, Takamizawa and Kaijir [in 
57] proposed an authentication method for distance learning applications by using 
cellular phones as an authentication token by using functions available on the phone (e.g., 
camera, GPS, etc.) for authentication. Furthermore, they proposed to potentially use a 
phone's GPS functionality (if it was available). Three years later the same authors [in 56] 
proposed using the location of a cellular tower as a second factor for authentication. The 
weakness in these related works is that, in most devices, the GPS location can be spoofed 
– either in hardware, through the operating system, or even at the application level [28]. 
From our perspective, this is a significant weakness.  
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In 2012, Zhang, Kondoro, and Muftic proposed a hybrid approach for location-
based authentication and authorization using smartphones [69]. Their approach proposed 
using two sets of location inputs obtained from two different location sources: the IP 
address of the client and the MAC address of a nearby access point with the strongest 
signal. The weakness in this method is that it requires two sets of location inputs from 
two different types of sources, which may be difficult to obtain on all devices. Moreover, 
the method also suffers from the potential for spoofing GPS, using a network proxy to 
spoof the IP address, or the introduction of a rogue access point with a spoofed MAC 
address. This renders the method vulnerable and inconsistent. 
Utilizing GPS as a proof of location inherently has weaknesses. Not all devices 
that users utilize (particularly mobile devices) have GPS built into them (e.g., laptops and 
tablets typically have no such support); therefore, LBAC systems that use GPS location 
for location proofs and/or access control fail to provide services to users of these devices. 
Another weakness inherent with GPS is that it suffers from performance limitations when 
devices are indoors. There are often too many physical barriers to get precise location 
fixes using satellites. It is therefore quite challenging to achieve a precise location proof 
indoors using GPS. 
2.1.2 LBAC Systems That Use Wireless Sensor Networks for Localization 
There is a wide variety of sensor types that can be used in wireless sensor 
networks. This has led to several techniques for user localization using devices in 
wireless sensor networks. In [45], techniques of localization in wireless sensor networks 
are surveyed: angle of arrival measurements, distance-based measurements, and RSS 
based measurements. There have also been hybrid systems that use both wireless sensor 
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networks and WLANs for localization. The authors [in 21] propose using both time and 
power measurements of devices in reference to three sensor nodes. The authors [in 12] 
proposes RSSI-based indoor localization for wireless sensor networks in smart homes. 
Furthermore, there have also been hybrid systems that use both wireless sensor networks 
and WLANs for LBAC. For example [51], which specifies authorization based on both 
role and location in a WLAN with assistance from a sensor network. However, using 
wireless sensor networks for LBAC requires additional infrastructure (the embedded 
wireless devices), and often, these devices must be more capable than simple routers or 
switches in WLANs. Therefore, this method can be costly to deploy and maintain. 
2.1.3 LBAC Systems That Use Bluetooth for Localization 
Most smartphones today are Bluetooth capable. Bluetooth is a standard for short-
range wireless communication that allows portable devices such as cell phones and 
laptops to communicate with each other. Its range is typically less than 10 meters. 
Inherently, this is a weakness in that the distance between devices that utilize Bluetooth 
for communication must be small. There is existing research that has studied utilizing 
Bluetooth for localization. For example, the authors [in 41] propose using Bluetooth Low 
Energy (BLE) for indoor localization. Vascak and Savko [in 62] propose using BLE for 
indoor localization and navigation. Furthermore, there is existing research that has 
studied utilizing Bluetooth for LBAC applications. One such work proposed to use 
Bluetooth devices to broadcast location proofs. Jansen and Korolev proposed a location-
based authentication mechanism that employs policy beacons [33], which are small 
Bluetooth devices placed in an area where a distinct policy is in effect. This was done so 
that a user's device could establish proximity to the beacons. 
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Similarly, Grumaz [in 26] proposed to use multiple Bluetooth token devices to 
transmit keys to be used by Bluetooth-enabled devices for access management purposes. 
Also, Van Rijswijk-Deij [in 61] proposed using Bluetooth to transmit a one-time 
password. In this work (as shown in Figure 2-1), a mobile application installed on a 
smartphone scans for the one-time password beacon that is transmitted by a Bluetooth-
enabled device. It then uses that password with a key saved on the device to authenticate 
to a server (providing some service or resource). The weakness in these approaches is 
that Bluetooth typically has a short range. It is, therefore, challenging to deploy the 
system for LBAC systems in large areas or for devices that are not always close to users 
wishing access to resources. Moreover, Bluetooth requires additional hardware that is not 
always guaranteed to be in every user's device. 
 
Figure 2-1: Bluetooth Onetime password system's overview [61]. 
Other Bluetooth-based LBAC systems were introduced ([14][23][58]) that 
employ knowledge of neighbors. In these systems, a user (called a claimer) authenticates 
by proving proximity to trusted users (called verifiers). The verifiers are in charge of 
creating location proofs that the claimer uses to prove its heir location to the 
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authentication server. However, the problem with this method is that it requires the 
participation of verifiers that need to register to the authentication server and be at a 
specific location. Moreover, these LBAC systems can be compromised if a verifier acts 
maliciously. 
2.1.4 LBAC Systems That Use IEEE 802.11 Access Points for Localization 
Because IEEE 802.11 systems and devices are ubiquitous (both indoors and, to 
some degree, outdoors) and are becoming a primary way to access large networks such as 
the Internet, there has been a lot of research that has studied utilizing IEEE 802.11 as a 
means of localization, particularly indoors (see [6,31,43,64]). Some of these have also 
been applied in LBAC applications. Specifically, this is done using channel 
characteristics to derive a location proof, or by having the IEEE 802.11 access points 
provide the location proof. Since this represents a large body of existing work, each of 
these will be discussed below. 
2.1.4.1 Channel characteristic-based IEEE 802.11 systems 
Using this method, location proofs are derived by using signal information 
received from access points. Such information includes SSID, MAC address, and RSSI – 
all being broadcasted by surrounding access points. These systems are used for 
applications such as pairing co-located devices [2] or to protect against wormhole attacks 
in services like Samsung pay [52]. In some systems, location proofs are derived from the 
physical layer information for signals received from the surrounding access points. This 
information includes multipath profiles [as in 65], which relies on the similarity of 
multipath profiles for co-located users. Moreover, location proofs are derived using 
mathematical modeling on channel characteristics; for example, [in 24] a statistical model 
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is used on RSSIs, [in 27] neural network decisions are used after training the model using 
RSSIs, and [in 34] a fuzzy extractor is used on channel characteristics and RSSIs. 
Moreover, the authors (in [67]) proposed generating a public location tag using RSSIs, 
packet sequence numbers, and MAC addresses of the ambient access points for proximity 
detection, the authors (in [70]) proposed using a bloom filter and a fuzzy extractor on 
IEEE 802.11 frames and the control messages in 4G LTE network to derive location 
proofs. A well-known example is Amigo [in 55], a technique that authenticates co-
located devices using knowledge of their shared radio environment as proof of physical 
proximity. Co-located devices tend to have similar characteristics. In the proposed 
technique, the mobile device collects information (including RSSI values) from nearby 
access points. A classifier is then trained with data that indicates that two devices are co-
located if they are five centimeters apart. Then, the proof of physical proximity is used to 
securely pair co-located devices. 
The authors [in 36] proposed generating a location proof by using the wireless 
signal information of a user's current location to authenticate to a server which then 
verifies the location proofs using a database of available Wi-Fi stations at different 
locations. However, this method requires frequent updates to the database in order for the 
system to operate properly. In general, it is challenging to use methods that utilize 
channel characteristics in client-server-based applications, because in these systems, the 
server must be able to verify the location proofs. Consequently, it must have real-time 
access to the channel characteristic used in the generation of the location proofs, which is 
challenging for systems that use a remote verification server. 
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2.1.4.2 Token-based systems 
In token-based systems, the access points are in charge of producing a token that 
can be used as a location proof. In 2006, Cho, Bao, and Goodrich proposed a system to 
control access to a WLAN infrastructure based on IEEE 802.11 devices [15]. As shown 
in Figure 2-3, areas, where network access was to be granted (called access groups), were 
defined by the overlapping coverage of the access points. In the proposed system, the 
mobile device collects nonces from multiple access points that are collectively used to 
define an access group. A nonce is an arbitrary number that can be used just once in 
cryptographic communication. The mobile device then derives a location key based on 
the nonces that is used to authenticate and connect to one of the access points. The 
weakness in this system is that it assumes the access points to be interconnected through 
a secure channel in order to exchange their nonces (without specifying how) so that any 
access point in their proposed system could authenticate users. This usually entails extra 
connections and hardware that complicates the system. Moreover, a user device may only 
connect to the network through access points that have access to the nonces. On the other 
hand, in their proposed system, access areas (i.e., the area where access to resources is to 
be granted) are specified by whether the user's device receives the access point's 
broadcast. Usually, devices can receive broadcasts from extended ranges. This results in 
difficulties in defining smaller access areas.  
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Figure 2-2: Defining areas granted network access [15]. 
A similar system is proposed by the same authors [in 8] and involves the use of a 
key server as shown in Figure 2-4. The key server manages the distribution of keys to the 
access points. The mobile device collects the keys from the access points and submits an 
access request through the network infrastructure. The key server verifies the request and 
makes the authorization decision to grant or to deny access. The user must use the same 
network infrastructure in order to connect to the key server for authorization. The 
weakness in this system is that a key server is needed, thus adding extra hardware and 
cost. On the other hand, similar to the system above, access areas are specified by 
whether the user's device receives the access point's broadcast, which results in 
difficulties in defining smaller access areas. 
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Figure 2-3: The key server distributes keys to the access points [8]. 
Huseynov and Seigneur [in 32] proposed using the SSID field in the beacon frame 
to provide a one-time password (OTP). The OTP is used as a second authentication factor 
when authenticating to a remote server. The major weakness here is that it does not truly 
utilize localization. It is merely a proximity-based system; therefore, any users who are 
connected to the access points (and the key server) may be granted access. Moreover, the 
proposed system does not continue verifying a user's presence once access is granted. 
Thus, if a user should leave the area, access would not necessarily be terminated. In order 
to have secure LBAC, continuous verification of a user's location is necessary. 
Bailey and Brainar proposed sending authentication data using the SSID field by 
setting two unidirectional channels as shown in Figure 2-6 [7]. Their One-touch Financial 
Transaction Authentication system uses a token device and the user's device to 
communicate and send the authentication data via broadcasting SSIDs. However, their 
proposed system is bi-directional and it occupies the user's Wi-Fi interface to send the 
authentication data by broadcasting SSIDs. Thus, the Wi-Fi interface on the user's device 
is occupied and cannot be used for network connection functionalities. 
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Figure 2-4: One-touch Financial Transaction Authentication system overview [7]. 
There is also other research that involves utilizing wireless access points to issue 
location proofs for devices. In [35], a user requests a location proof from the access point, 
which provides it and then sends it to a server that is connected to a verifier. In their 
proposed system, the verifier receives location claims from users and subsequently 
verifies them. In [42], a third-party server and an access point work together to issue a 
location proof for a user requesting it. Then, the user uses this location proof to get access 
to a LBS. In [53], access points send out beacons advertising their support for location 
proofs. A user then requests a location proof by sending information about the beacon 
frame received. Subsequently, the access point verifies the user's request and provides the 
user with a location proof. 
In general, the location proofs issued to the user's device certify the user’s 
presence near the access point. Moreover, a location proof issued by an access point can 
be used by the user's device to prove the current location or a past location. In general, in 
these systems, the device requests a location proof from an access point. The access point 
then verifies the request and issues a location proof. However, the users must be 
connected to the access point in order to receive location proofs. As a result, clients lose 
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their freedom to choose the connection to access the desired network on which the 
requested resource(s) reside. Another weakness is that this method puts the responsibility 
of providing connection to the desired network on the access points providing location 
proofs, which also put the burden on the user to be connected to the access point that 
sends location proofs in order to be able to get one. 
Pandey, Anjum, Kim, and Agrawal propose a scheme based on the current access 
point's capability of transmitting at different power levels [48]. In this work, multiple 
access points transmit nonces at different power levels. As shown in Figure 2-7, each 
region has its unique set of nonces based on how far the region is from the access points. 
A user's device responds by retransmitting the set of messages it received to the access 
point it is associated with. These messages are then used to determine the location of the 
user's device. This proposed system's main purpose is localization; it does not have an 
access control element; moreover, it does not study the possibility of using the nonces for 
LBAC applications. In addition, the system requires a separate controller (an extra 
computing unit) that is connected to all of the access points. 
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Figure 2-5: Three access points transmitting nonces at three different power levels 
[48]. 
 
2.1.5 LBAC Systems Using Other Technologies 
This subsection discusses related research that proposes other technologies for 
LBAC uses. 
2.1.5.1 Near Field Communication (NFC)-based systems 
NFC is a short-range wireless connectivity standard that uses the magnetic field 
induction to enable communication between devices that are very close (i.e., within a few 
centimeters of each other). LBAC systems that utilize NFC typically require the user to 
be very close to NFC devices because they operate at short range. Xin-fang, Ming-wei, 
and Jun-ju [in 68] present a LBAC system to protect data security in mobile storage 
devices by embedding an RFID tag that makes it only possible to read the encrypted files 
on the mobile device when a device is at specific locations. Berbecaru [10] proposed 
using a token received by an NFC device as an authentication factor. Avdyushkin and 
Rahman [in 4] proposed using NFC along with a Wi-Fi access point to validate the 
location of users. In their proposed system, a unique identifier is obtained from an NFC 
tag installed in an area and scanned by the user's device. Subsequently, the user's device 
sends it to the server using a proximate access point. The server then verifies the user's 
location by checking if the tag was received from a proximate access point. However, 
LBAC systems using NFC require additional hardware and NFC capable mobile devices. 
Even today, many mobile devices do not support NFC (i.e., this is not currently 
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guaranteed). Therefore, coverage may be limited, and users not possessing NFC-enabled 
devices would not be able to use the system. 
2.1.5.2 Cellular tower-based systems 
Wullems, Looi, and Clark proposed location-based auditing and access control by 
using the global cellular ID, which the user's device is connected to, and by using the 
timing advance measurements (i.e., the time taken for the signal to travel between the 
mobile device and cellular tower) to calculate the mobile device's location [66]. The 
weakness in this approach is that cellular towers do not provide a location that is accurate 
enough for precise localization; therefore, it is not always suitable for access control 
applications. 
2.2 Conclusion 
As seen from the related work, there is relatively little that addresses LBAC in an 
inexpensive and deployment-ready way, and that is unobtrusive for users. Most of the 
proposed work includes extra authentication steps, which is inconvenient for the users, or 
includes additional hardware and networking requirements. Moreover, most of the 
research addresses either location fixing (i.e., where the user is) or access control (i.e., is 
the user authorized to access a resource). However, we believe that it is important to 
address both as a whole by providing a unified method to address location fixing and 
access control simultaneously, and in an unobtrusive way using the current ubiquitous 
IEEE 802.11 infrastructure. This has the potential to result in an efficient, inexpensive, 






THE PROPOSED SYSTEM 
 
In this chapter, we introduce our proposed LBAC system architecture. The overall 
architecture is discussed in Section 3.1, and the design requirements for an efficient 
LBAC system are discussed in Section 3.2. The design of our proposed system is 
introduced in Section 3.3, and the challenges in achieving this design are discussed in 
Section 3.4. We conclude in Section 3.5. 
3.1 LBAC Architecture 
Conventional access control systems rely on the identities of users to determine 
access rights. In LBAC systems, however, access rights are additionally determined by 
the locations of the users. An example of such a need is limiting access to sensitive 
information when employees are located in a building or a room at a workplace. In 
LBAC, not only is a user's identity verified, but the user's location is also required. Once 
verified, the user is granted access to a particular resource that corresponds to the access 
policy in place. The access policy outlines the users of the system and their 
corresponding access rights to different resources provided by the system. Thus, in 
LBAC systems, the identities of the users along with their physical location play a role in 
determining what resources they are granted access to. Typical LBAC authentication 
procedures are shown in Figure 3-1. In the system shown in the figure, it is assumed that   
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able to verify it. This is unlike other LBAC systems, where some other node in 
the network (e.g., an access point, controller, etc.) is in charge of generating and/or 
verifying location proofs. The authorization entity is in charge of verifying the user's 
credentials and authorizing access to requested resources. The steps for authentication 
and authorization in a LBAC system are as follows: 
1. A user sends his/her identity and requests access to resources. 
2. The authorization entity requests the credentials that prove the user's identity. These 
credentials are dependent on the number of authentication factors. For single-factor 
authentication, the authorization entity only requests a location proof. However, for 
multi-factor authentication, the authorization entity additionally requests other 
credentials (e.g., a password, biometric identifier, etc.) along with the location proof. 
 
Figure 3-1: Typical LBAC authentication process. 
3. The user responds with the credentials that include a location proof to the 
authorization entity. 
4. The authorization entity verifies the received credentials, including the location proof. 
Based on that information, it grants or denies the user access to the requested 
resource(s). If access is granted, it determines the resources that the user has access to 
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based on the user's identity and location. To accomplish this, the authorization entity 
maintains an access policy that contains all user identities in the system and their 
access rights at each distinct physical location. Access to resources is granted 
according to these policies. 
3.2 Design Requirements 
The goal of this dissertation is to design an effective LBAC system that meets the 
following requirements: (1) security; (2) convenience for users of the system; (3) 
robustness; (4) cost; and (5) supports access policies that grant or deny access to 
resources. These are each discussed in the following subsections. 
3.2.1 Security 
One of the most essential characteristics of a LBAC system is security. In general, 
access control is intrinsically about security and focuses on ensuring that only authorized 
users obtain access to requested resources. Security is perhaps more critical when dealing 
with sensitive data and/or resources. Ensuring a system's security includes having all the 
elements of the system protected from unauthorized access and shielded against potential 
attacks. Ensuring a system’s security includes securing the communications between the 
different nodes in the system by using secure links. A secure link is encrypted by one or 
more security protocols to ensure the security of data flowing between the nodes. 
Therefore, a secure system uses powerful encryption techniques. Furthermore, to ensure a 
system’s security, it is important to study the possible security vulnerabilities in the 
system, and then address them. 
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Another potential aspect of security is limiting access to resources when users are 
physically located inside an access area. Therefore, a user’s sessions should be terminated 
once outside the area defined for access. 
3.2.2 User Convenience 
User convenience is a very important factor for any system's success. User 
convenience can be indicated by the amount of burden that is put on users in order to 
perform authentication to obtain access to resources. It is well known that users are the 
weakest link in the security of systems. Therefore, systems that limit user interaction (or 
at least limit the physical interaction of users) fare better. The two-factor authentication 
system RSA SecurID requires users to input a six-digit code displayed on a physical 
token device, along with their username and password. Moreover, users must often enter 
a second code after a (sometimes) significant delay. Systems that require extra steps to 
authenticate users tend to drive them away. Often, such systems become stagnant because 
users seldom use them. Admittedly, user convenience is typically seen as a trade-off with 
respect to security [63]. However, is this really the case? We believe that, in many cases, 
it is possible to design a system that is convenient for users without compromising 
security. Moreover, this can be done by using available data that does not require extra 
user interaction to increase the system's security. An example of this is using cameras and 
face recognition technology to unlock an iPhone. 
3.2.3 Robustness 
In computer science, robustness is defined as the degree to which a system or 
component can function correctly in the presence of invalid inputs or stressful 
environmental conditions [40]. In location-based systems, robustness is essential due to 
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the unsteady nature of location data. Location data often fluctuate; therefore, the system 
must anticipate these kinds of changes and act accordingly. Furthermore, an efficient 
LBAC system must be optimizable so that tolerance and rigidity are assured in order to 
achieve the best results for a particular deployment. 
3.2.4 Cost 
The financial aspect is an important aspect when an organization is determining 
an appropriate LBAC system to use. Very sophisticated and accurate LBAC systems can 
be designed using customized hardware if money is not an issue. However, cost is 
important and must be minimized when possible. The cost of a system includes 
equipment costs, deployment costs, maintenance costs, and so on. It is important to 
consider the cost when designing a LBAC system. Usually, more complex systems are 
harder to install and maintain, resulting in higher costs. A cost-efficient LBAC system 
minimizes new equipment, installation, and maintenance costs. 
3.2.5 Location-based Access Policies 
A typical access control system in an organization usually supports multiple 
resources and multiple access rights and permissions. Traditional access control policies 
manage who accesses what. However, in LBAC systems, access control policies manage 
who accesses what – and where. It is essential that an LBAC system is configured with 
the desired access policies and subsequently follows these policies reliably. Figure 3-2 
illustrates an example of a typical location-based access policy. 
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Figure 3-2: An example of a location-based access policy. 
3.3 Proposed System Design 
In this section, the proposed system's design is presented. By design, it must meet 
the design requirements discussed above. Moreover, the proposed design is set to 
overcome the weaknesses in other systems noted in the related work in the previous 
chapter. The proposed system utilizes IEEE 802.11 (Wi-Fi) technology, which helps meet 
various design requirements as it is inexpensive and broadly available. This results in a 
LBAC system that can be deployed right now in just about any setting. 
The proposed method of localization utilizes broadcasted signals to provide an 
accurate and secure LBAC system. Access areas, which are areas where access to 
resources are granted, are defined by coverage of one or several access points. These 
access points broadcast a unique token every predefined period. This period can be varied 
(and is discussed later). A user's device collects the broadcasted tokens from the access 
points and their corresponding RSSI values and uses this information to authenticate to 
the authorization entity. 
In the experimental environment in which the proposed system was implemented 
and tested, the authorization entity is software that is added to the resource (which is a 
simple server). It is in charge of authenticating and authorizing users for access to 
resources. In this text, authorization entity and the resource server are used 
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interchangeably to reflect the experimental environment. In practice, however, they could 
be separate entities. The authorization entity makes the decision to grant or deny access 
to resources. Moreover, it determines what specific resources to grant the user access to 
based on the access policy in place. 
The proposed LBAC system, as is typical in access control systems, performs 
identification, authentication, and authorization. As shown in Figure 3-3, the goal of 
identification is to identify a user requesting access to resources. In a LBAC system, this 
can be done by requiring a username and by only granting access to identified users in 
approved locations. The goal of authentication is to verify the identity of a user 
requesting access to resources. In the proposed LBAC system, authentication is done by 
having the user's device send the broadcasted tokens of nearby access points (along with 
a password – if two-factor authentication is desired). Consequently, the goal of 
authorization is to authorize access to resources. Here, the authorization entity verifies the 
credentials received from the user's device and makes the decision to authorize or deny 
access. Moreover, it determines what specific resources to grant the user access to. 
 
Figure 3-3: Identification, authentication and authorization in the proposed LBAC. 
In the proposed system, the IEEE 802.11 protocol is utilized because it is cost-
effective, extensively deployed, and already integrated into most of the infrastructure all 
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over the world today. Furthermore, the beacon frame in the IEEE 802.11 protocol can be 
easily modified to carry tokens, and it can be broadcasted repeatedly over a very small 
period. The proposed design allows for existing or new IEEE 802.11 network interfaces 
to broadcast tokens for use in authentication. User devices can listen to and process 
tokens broadcasted by access points in range without necessarily being associated with or 
connected to them (e.g., for network access). The LBAC system allows users the freedom 
to choose their network connection using the access points they desire (e.g., any Wi-Fi 
network that can provide network access). 
One of the most significant benefits of the proposed LBAC system is that it is a 
zero-interaction system (i.e., it is unobtrusive for users). This will provide convenience to 
users and will minimize the complexity of the system. Specifically, a user's device 
receives broadcasted tokens from the access points without needing to be connected to 
them (e.g., for network access). This is a passive process, which is different from existing 
methods. Access points can have multiple wireless network interfaces, typically 
corresponding to a unique Wi-Fi frequency (currently 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz for IEEE 
802.11 Wi-Fi). However, some access points have more than one wireless network 
interface for each of the frequencies. Moreover, some access points support the creation 
and configuration of virtual network interfaces that can broadcast their own beacon 
frames. This is done by subdividing a physical interface into two or more virtual 
interfaces on which unique network parameters can be assigned (e.g., a physical address, 
an IP address, etc.). The benefit of this is that a specified network interface can be 
dedicated for token transmission to support the proposed system. 
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In the proposed LBAC system, the access area (i.e., the area where access to 
resources is to be granted) is defined by the coverage of one or multiple access points. As 
shown in Figure 3-4, an access area is best defined by the overlap of coverage of 
typically three token transmitting access points. The access area's size can be customized 
by defining appropriate RSSI values where access is to be granted and configuring the 
authorization entity with these values. Our design aims to grant access when the coverage 
of the token transmitting access points used for that access area overlaps (i.e., with 
appropriate RSSI values), and the user can collect the tokens broadcasted by these access 
points. More details about defining the appropriate RSSI values for an access area are 
discussed in Section 4.4.3 in the next chapter. 
 
Figure 3-4: Defining an access area by access point coverage. 
Most buildings today have IEEE 802.11 access points installed at different 
locations. They are mainly used to provide wireless connectivity to a network. The 
proposed system makes use of these access points (and their associated coverage) to 
define an area where access to resources is granted. As previously discussed, the RSSI 
values of the access points at the mobile device's location give an indication of the 
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location of the mobile device in reference to these access points. For example, having a 
device in the middle between two access points is reflected by the RSSI values at the 
mobile device's location and indicates that the device is located between them. This is 
because the RSSI measurements for the two access points in this case will be close to 
each other. Therefore, in the proposed system, the RSSI values of the token transmitting 
access points at the device's location are utilized in making the decision of granting or 
denying access to resources. 
In order to make sure that users have access to resources if they maintain their 
presence in the access area. The user's device must repeatedly send the latest tokens 
broadcasted by the access points and their corresponding RSSI values every predefined 
period. If the user's device fails to do so, the authorization entity should immediately 
terminate the user's session and deny further access to resources. This period is 
configured in the authorization entity and is optimized as it presents a trade-off between 
security and efficiency. This period must not be too long that the user can maintain access 
outside the access area, and not too short that it will consume resources at the access 
points, user's device, and the authorization entity. 
In the proposed system, the authorization entity is in charge of verifying the 
credentials provided by the users. As previously discussed, in the proposed system, these 
credentials include the tokens broadcasted by the access points and collected by the user's 
device along with corresponding RSSI values. Consequently, the authorization entity is 
responsible for verifying these tokens, and if the RSSI values are within range of the ones 
configured at the authorization entity for a specific access area. Furthermore, the 
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authorization entity is configured with the access policy that contains the users' profiles 
and their access rights at different locations. 
So far, the proposed LBAC system consists of the authorization entity with the 
access policy at one end, and the access points that are modified to broadcast tokens 
periodically using the beacon frame at the other end. Users then employ the tokens and 
RSSI values of these access points to authenticate to the authorization entity. Figure 3-5 
illustrates an overview of the proposed system's operation, and is followed by a step by 
step explanation: 
 
Figure 3-5: The proposed system operation. 
1. At time 𝑡1, the access points (three in the figure above) broadcast tokens 
simultaneously using the beacon frame. The user's device collects the tokens, their 
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corresponding RSSI values, and the MAC addresses of the access points. The user's 
device then derives the location proof using the following formula: 
 
𝐿𝑃(𝑡) = ||𝑖=0




 𝐿𝑃(𝑡) is the location proof at time 𝑡. 
| | denotes concatenation. 
 𝑛 is the number of token transmitting access points in range of the user’s device. 
 𝑀𝐴𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑖 is the MAC address of the access point 𝐴𝑃𝑖 transmitting the token. 
 𝑇𝑘𝐴𝑃𝑖 is the deobfuscation of the obfuscated token broadcasted by the access 
point 𝐴𝑃𝑖.  
𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐴𝑃𝑖 is the RSSI (in dBm) measured at the user's device for access point 𝐴𝑃𝑖. 
As can be seen from Equation 3-1, the location proof is the concatenation of the 
tokens transmitted by the access points, the RSSI measurements of these access 
points at the user's device, and the MAC addresses of the access points. 
2. When the device is authenticating with the authorization entity, the user's device 
sends this location proof to the authorization entity. 
3. The authorization entity receives the location proof. It subsequently verifies the 
tokens and determines if the RSSIs correspond to the configured values of an access 
area. These RSSI values only appear if the user is inside the specified access area. 
Therefore, if the location proof contains valid RSSI values, they will fall in the 
configured ranges of the access area at the authorization entity. This means that the 
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user is inside the access area. Then, access to resources is granted or denied based on 
validity of the tokens and the RSSIs. 
4. As in step 1, at time 𝑡2, the access points simultaneously broadcast new tokens. The 
user's device collects the new tokens and their corresponding RSSI values and derives 
a new location proof 𝐿𝑃(𝑡2) using Equation 3-1. 
5. In order to maintain access to resources, the user's device then sends the new location 
proof to the authorization entity. 
6. As in step 3, the authorization entity verifies the received location proof, and either 
continues to grant access to resources or terminates access to resources. 
The proposed system is expected to meet the LBAC design requirements of cost 
as it utilizes inexpensive and ubiquitous IEEE 802.11 access points. The proposed design 
is expected to be secure as it requires the user's device to continue providing a new 
location proof to make sure that the user's device is still physically present in the access 
area. 
The period for requiring new authentication information from devices should be 
carefully optimized and configured at the authorization entity. It should not be so small 
that it drains resources at the user's device (e.g., processing power, battery, etc.), nor 
should it drain the system's network resources (e.g., causing large overhead and slowing 
down data transmission). On the other hand, it should not be so large that it is possible for 
users to leave the access area without having their access to resources terminated. 
The proposed method allows flexibility with respect to authentication, as it can be 
deployed with or without requiring a username (in this case, a temporary user ID can be 
assigned instead). It is possible to use the tokens broadcasted by the access points as the 
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only authentication factor; however, they can be used as a second authentication factor 
along with a password. 
In the proposed system, the token transmitting access points, as discussed later, 
generate tokens locally using pre-shared keys. A pre-shared key is a shared secret that 
was previously agreed upon between two parties. Thus, token generation is done locally 
on both parties (i.e., on the access points and the authorization entity) to minimize extra 
hardware and/or connections, and more importantly, doing so elsewhere could increase 
the risk of attackers intercepting this process and obtaining knowledge of the token 
generation process. Each token broadcasted by the access points should be unique at 
every point in time so that historical data cannot be used to determine a future token. 
The RSSI values of the token transmitting access points are used in the 
authentication process because they provide an indication of the user's location in 
reference to the access points. Thus, our proposed system requires initial calibration at 
deployment to collect the range of RSSI values from token transmitting access points in 
the desired access area. The system uses this data to configure the authorization entity to 
aid in making resource authorization decisions. The calibration process helps to set 
precise access areas. This process can be performed manually by dedicating devices for 
this purpose or by crowdsourcing the problem and utilizing devices of trusted users to 
obtain RSSI values throughout a potential access area as in [11]. Crowdsourcing is a 
process through which a task is completed through a group of participants. In the 
proposed system, the calibration process can be done by using the RSSI values recorded 
at trusted users’ devices to configure an access area’s accepted ranges at the authorization 
entity. 
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One of the strengths of our proposed design is that it utilizes existing IEEE 802.11 
infrastructure and builds on top of it by adding the LBAC functionality. In the next 
section, the potential challenges of achieving the proposed system are discussed. These 
are synchronization, security of tokens, and access areas. 
3.4 Design Challenges 
The proposed system is intended to meet the design requirements for an effective 
and efficient LBAC system. It consists of multiple elements that must be carefully 
designed in order to achieve the objective of this research. Below are some of the 
challenges in achieving such a system. 
3.4.1 Synchronization 
Synchronization is essential for security in LBAC systems, and it is a very 
important aspect of the proposed system. In our design, access points are modified to 
broadcast tokens using the beacon frame. Collectively, tokens (along with RSSI values) 
provide a location proof. The tokens are time-sensitive, in that a user must have the latest 
tokens from all participating access points in order to be successfully authenticated. 
Therefore, all participating access points in the system must be synchronized, along with 
the authorization entity. Synchronization allows users to generate valid location proofs 
and permits the authorization entity to successfully verify the location proofs of users 
requesting resources. If the system becomes inoperable, from a power outage, for 
example, the process of synchronization places the system back into an operative state. 
3.4.2 Security of Tokens 
To combat the potential threat of attackers attempting to gain unauthorized access 
to resources in the system by generating their own valid tokens (thereby bypassing the 
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access points entirely), it is important to discuss the manner in which the tokens are 
generated. In our proposed system, the access points generate and transmit tokens that the 
user’s device utilizes to derive a location proof. Securing the process of generating and 
transmitting tokens can be done through the use of efficient cryptographic schemes that 
utilize a pre-shared secret. The authorization entity should be able to verify the legitimacy 
of the location proofs of users; therefore, it is essential to determine the best fitting type 
of encryption algorithm. 
3.4.3 Access Areas 
Access areas describe the areas where access to resources is granted so long as a 
user (meaning a user's device) is physically located within them. In the proposed system, 
access areas are implemented by cleverly utilizing RSSI values of participating access 
points. Specifically, the RSSI values are collected by user devices and provide a relative 
strength of the signal received from the access points. This can subsequently be used to 
infer a location or distance from the access points. By utilizing a collection of access 
points, a user's position can be accurately determined. Admittedly, an initial calibration 
must be performed so that RSSI values relative to each of the access points are known. It 
should be noted that there are edge cases; these are areas outside of the access area 
(where access to resources should not be granted) that the authorization entity may 
unwittingly consider within the access area. This is a result of the potential for error in 
the RSSI values (i.e., they are not extremely precise). This possibility must, of course, be 
minimized; after all, a good LBAC system should not grant access to resources outside of 
defined access area(s). It is therefore essential that the proposed LBAC system is 
configured correctly such that the system minimizes false positives and false negatives. 
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On the other hand, it is important to note that, different user devices will result in 
different RSSI values for the same access points. Therefore, it is not the actual RSSI 
values that are important; rather, it is the combination of all of the collected RSSI values 
that establishes a relative position that is specifically based on the user's device. 
Therefore, it is essential that the proposed LBAC system is configured correctly to 
address the differences in device capabilities. 
3.5 Conclusion 
LBAC systems control access to resources utilizing location information via 
location proofs. Moreover, they are essential in today's mobile environment, where 
virtually everything is accessible through a computer network. People use LBAC systems 
in everyday life for different functions (e.g., making payments, in banking applications, 
merely accessing information, etc.). We strongly believe that strengthening the security 
of LBAC systems is research-worthy. Moreover, structuring the system in such a way 
that minimizes user interaction increases security, user-convenience, and robustness. 
In this chapter, design requirements for an effective LBAC system were 
presented. Subsequently, we proposed a new LBAC system design that is intended to 
meet the proposed design requirements. Challenges involved in achieving such a system 
were then discussed. Achieving the proposed system with good performance is 
significant, because it would provide a LBAC system in which the location of  the user is 
continuously verified in a way that guarantees authorized access to resources when users 
are physically present in predefined access areas. Our proposed LBAC system does this 
in a convenient way precluding effort from users, and without requiring additional 
infrastructure. This is the motivation for utilizing ubiquitous IEEE 802.11 infrastructure, 
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and will be discussed in the next chapter, by simply modifying the firmware of existing 
access points. We believe that designing an unobtrusive, inexpensive, and secure LBAC 










In this chapter, we discuss implementation specifics that takes our design (from 
the previous chapter) and implements it in a research testing environment. In addition, 
several details omitted in the design are included here for completeness. Section 4.1 
examines the deployment overview, Section 4.2 addresses the design requirements in an 
applied manner, Section 4.3 enumerates the system's components and their 
implementation specifics, Section 4.4 presents the experiments to test our proposed 
design, Section 4.5 discusses an example scenario, and we conclude in Section 4.6. 
4.1 Deployment Overview 
Due to the added task of determining user locations, a LBAC system typically has 
more elements than a regular access control system. The proposed system, as shown in 
Figure 4-1, consists of the following three elements:  
1. The user's device with custom designed client software installed. The client software 
is installed on the user's device and enables it to integrate within the proposed LBAC 
system. More details about the client software will be discussed in detail later in this 
chapter. 
2. The access points that broadcast the tokens used as location proofs. In general, the 
number of access points used for authentication depends on the specifics of 
52 
deployment. Characteristics such as, for example, the desired security level, the 
building's layout, obstacles and materials used in the building, and so on will affect 
this. The proposed system allows implementing access areas using a single access 
point. However, three access points at minimum are required to determine 
localization sufficiently (via triangulation). In more complex environments (or in 
environments with more complex access areas), however, additional access points 
may be needed. 
3. The authorization entity that verifies a user's location proof and makes the decision to 
grant or deny access to resources. It additionally determines the resources that are 
granted to the user according to the access policy in place. 
As seen in Figure 4-1, the direction of the arrows denotes the direction of 
communication. A user's device does not need to establish communication with 
participating access points. It passively detects the access points by scanning for and 
obtaining their broadcasts and for RSSI values and inspecting the beacon frame for 
tokens – to derive a location proof. However, a user's device must establish two-way 
communication with the authorization entity in order to get authenticated, and then 
authorized to get access to resources. 
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Figure 4-1: The proposed system's overview. 
As previously discussed, the number of participating access points depends on 
deployment specifics and is further configured at the authorization entity. Since the 
proposed system uses existing IEEE 802.11 infrastructure, defined access areas depend 
on the position of access points in a location (e.g., a building). Moreover, the decision of 
access area locations can be made by taking an inventory of existing IEEE 802.11 access 
points and including some or all of them in the proposed LBAC system. Figure 4-2 
illustrates an example of a deployment in a generic office setting. As seen in the figure, 
the locations of existing access points in the building are used to determine the access 
areas. If, for example, an access area is desired in offices 1, 2, and the conference room, 
access points AP2 and AP3 can be used to obtain tokens and RSSI values. Similarly, an 
access area for offices 3 and 4 can be created using token and RSSI values obtained from 
access points AP1 and AP3. An access area for the cubicles (in the center of the building 
space) can be created using access points AP3, AP4, and AP5. Of course, the proposed 
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LBAC system supports the addition of new access points that can be precisely positioned 
to more precisely define access areas if desired. 
 
Figure 4-2: An example for the access areas configuration based on the floor plan. 
4.2 Design Requirements 
In order to successfully build the proposed system, the different elements of the 
system should be designed carefully so that they perform their tasks securely, effectively, 
and robustly. In this section, the design requirements for each of the system's elements 
are discussed. Specifically, the elements include the user's device (e.g., a smartphone), 
the participating access points (that generate the tokens), and the authorization entity. 
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4.2.1 Access Points 
In the proposed system, access points are tasked with broadcasting the tokens 
used by the user devices to ultimately derive a location proof. This section discusses the 
design requirements for the access points. 
4.2.1.1 Configurability 
The proposed design relies on having the access points broadcast tokens using the 
IEEE 802.11 beacon frame. Specifically, we utilize the SSID field. Regular off-the-shelf 
(OTS) access points do not typically permit programmable (dynamic) modification of the 
beacon frame, including the SSID field. To support this, open access points must be 
obtained, or existing access points must be flashed with a firmware that supports dynamic 
modification of the beacon frame. Furthermore, the firmware must support scheduling the 
task of repeatedly broadcasting tokens. 
4.2.1.2 Broadcast period 
The access points in the proposed system are intended to broadcast new tokens 
every fixed period. The access points must be able to perform this function in a reliable 
manner, minimizing the time that an access point needs to change the beacon frame and 
broadcast it. 
4.2.1.3 Access point functionality 
The proposed system utilizes the existing IEEE 802.11 infrastructure but requires 
a modification of the firmware in participating access points. Moreover, custom software 
that generates tokens and modifies the beacon frame must be placed on participating 
access points before they can work within the proposed system. Consideration must be 
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made to ensure that modifications do not compromise other functionality in the 
participating access points (e.g., providing access to a network). 
4.2.1.4 Processing power 
Participating access points must have sufficient processing power to perform the 
mathematical operations related to the cryptographic functions that are necessary to 
generate the tokens. This includes having enough processing power and memory to 
execute the custom software that generates the tokens without affecting the access point’s 
normal functionality (e.g., to provide access to a network). In our initial experiments, 
ASUS RT-N12 access points were utilized which have a 300 MHz processor and 32 MB 
RAM. Unfortunately, performance was not acceptable; therefore, access points with an 
800 MHz dual-core processor and 256 MB RAM were utilized instead. Details of the 
access points are discussed later in this chapter. 
4.2.2 User Devices 
The device of users who wish to use the system must support IEEE 802.11 
functionalities (i.e., the ability to scan for Wi-Fi access points). The proposed system 
supports a wide range of devices whose hardware and software requirements are 
available in most of the mobile devices sold in the market today (e.g., smartphones, 
laptops, and tablets). 
4.2.3 Authorization Entity 
As previously stated, the authorization entity is tasked with verifying a user's 
credentials, deciding whether to grant access to resources, and determining the resources 




The authorization entity must support connectivity using common network 
protocols. In our experiments, the SSH protocol is used for the connectivity between a 
user’s device and the authorization entity. Although the SSH protocol was used to test 
connectivity of the users’ devices to the authorization entity, it should be noted that any 
connection protocol can be used (e.g., web-based server, file transfer protocol (FTP), 
etc.). There are many different connection protocols, and choosing which depends on the 
resources available.  
4.2.3.2 Processing power 
The authorization entity is tasked with authenticating users (based on location and 
tokens obtained from participating access points) and making access control decisions for 
all users using the LBAC system. Thus, it must have enough processing power to support 
all anticipated users. In general, the processing power required by the authorization entity 
will depend on the number of users in the system. 
4.2.3.3 Robustness 
In the proposed system, the authorization entity requires the most processing 
power and network bandwidth. Moreover, it is essential to determine who gets access to 
what resources. Therefore, it carries the greatest responsibility in the system. A failure in 
the authorization entity could render the entire system inoperable. Of course, this is the 
case with any resource entity implementing an access policy in any current system. It is 
therefore paramount that recovery plans be in place in case of failure. Details about 
restoring synchronization are discussed later in this chapter. 
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4.2.3.4 Permissions and access rights support 
The proposed system serves a variety of users with different roles and different 
access rights. Therefore, selecting an appropriate operating system and file system to 
support this is important. This is discussed in more detail later in this chapter. 
4.3 Design Specifics 
In the previous section, design requirements for each of the system's elements 
were introduced. This section covers hardware and software specifics of the system that 
meet the design requirements. Moreover, they reflect the specifications used in our 
experiments. Section 4.3.1 discusses the design specifics of the access points, Section 
4.3.2 discusses the design specifics of user devices, and Section 4.3.3 discusses the 
design specifics of the authorization entity. Later in this chapter, the operations of these 
elements are clarified with an example scenario. 
4.3.1 Access Points 
In the proposed system, the Wi-Fi access points perform the usual access point 
function, which is providing access to a network. Furthermore, they broadcast the tokens 
that are used for the LBAC system. Since this is done in the SSID field of the beacon 
frame, the access points must be configurable and programmable. In most cases, the 
default firmware on OTS access points is not able to perform the necessary tasks required 
by our proposed system; therefore, third-party firmwares (such as DD-WRT, OpenWrt, 
Tomato, etc.) must be used and flashed on the access points. For our experiments, the 
DD-WRT firmware [see 17] was utilized. 
DD-WRT is a Linux-based third-party firmware for wireless routers and access 
points that supports a wide variety of access point models. In general, DD-WRT is one of 
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the few firmwares available that offers a powerful set of additional features and 
functionalities to provide more programmability and flexibility to the access points. 
There are various versions of DD-WRT, each of which supports different access point 
models. For our experiments, we used DD-WRT version 3.0-r37015M Kongac on the 
Netgear R6400 Wi-Fi access point. 
For our experiments, we controlled the participating access points via the Linux 
command line (or terminal), which is supported through the DD-WRT firmware. Most 
importantly, we needed to control the access point’s wireless network interface for token 
transmission. Moreover, several underlying applications were installed to support 
additional functionality: SSH was required for remote management of the access point; 
the Bash shell was required to create and execute software (in the form of scripts), and 
OpenSSL (a library for implementing cryptographic functions) was required to generate 
tokens properly. 
After researching different models of access points for support of these 
functionalities, the Netgear R6400 was selected. It is a dual-band access point (i.e., it 
operates on both 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz frequencies). This allows it to be used in the LBAC 
system while simultaneously providing network access. Figure 4-3 shows the Netgear 
R6400 access point and its hardware specifications. 
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Figure 4-3: The Netgear R6400 and its hardware specifications. 
As previously mentioned, participating access points modify the beacon frame 
and use the SSID field to broadcast tokens. In order to maintain the functionality of the 
access points to provide access to a production network, either one of the bands (2.4 GHz 
or 5 GHz) can be used for token transmission. In general, each of the bands' physical 
interfaces can be used to broadcast tokens. However, some access points allow 
configuring a virtual network interface that can be used to transmit tokens. A virtual 
interface provides a virtual version of a physical device that, through software, maps the 
virtual device to the physical device and utilizes the operating system's underlying device 
drivers. In our experiments, a virtual interface was created and configured to broadcast 
the tokens. As shown later in this chapter, we experimented broadcasting tokens using 
both frequencies. 
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4.3.1.1 Token generation 
As previously mentioned, the tokens are generated by utilizing a pre-shared secret 
between the access points and the authorization entity. In our proposed LBAC system, 
tokens are generated using the HMAC function as shown in Figure 4-4 and as follows: 
 
Figure 4-4: The HMAC-SHA-256 code generation process [19]. 
 
 𝐾ℎ = 𝐻𝑀𝐴𝐶(𝑘, 𝑡) = 𝐻( (𝑘 ⊕  𝑖) || 𝐻((𝑘 ⊕ 𝑜) || 𝑡)) Eq. 4-1 
Where 
 𝐻 is a cryptographic hash function. Secure Hash Algorithm-256 bits (SHA256) is 
used in the proposed system, which is a cryptographic hash function developed by 
the United States National Security Agency. More details about selecting 
SHA256 are discussed in the next chapter. 
 𝑡 is a timestamp in the format YYYYMMDDHHmm, where YYYY is the 4-digit 
year, MM is the two-digit month, DD is the two-digit day of the month, HH is the 
two-digit hour (in 24-hour format), and mm is the two-digit minute. 
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 𝑘 is the pre-shared secret, which is in ASCII (American Standard Code for 
Information Interchange) text form. ASCII is a character encoding standard for 
electronic communication. 
 ∥ denotes concatenation. 
 ⊕ denotes bitwise exclusive or (XOR), which is a binary operation. 
 𝑜 is the outer padding, consisting of the repeated hexadecimal bytes 0x5c (up to 
the block size). Padding is the process of filling a field with pad characters, which 
in this case are the repeated hexadecimal bytes 0x5c. 
 𝑖 is the inner padding, consisting of the repeated hexadecimal bytes 0x36 (up to 
the block size). 
In this research, two possible scenarios were considered: one where the access 
points have access to a time server for synchronization, and another where they do not. 
The description of these scenarios is as follows: 
4.3.1.1.1 Case 1: The access points have access to a time server 
In this case, the access points and the authorization entity have access to a time 
server. A time server is a separate server on the network that has access to the exact time 
and distributes this information to clients that request it. In general, when two nodes 
synchronize their time with a time server that is synchronized with actual time, they are 
synchronized. Figure 4-5 illustrates the token generation process that uses a synchronized 
time as input: 
1. Using the timestamp and the pre-shared secret, the HMAC function generates a 




Figure 4-5: The token generation process in case the access point has access to a time 
server. 
2. Due to the limited number of characters in the SSID field in the beacon frame, a 6-
digit decimal key is generated from the HMAC function as follows: 
 𝑇 = 𝐾 ℎ 𝑚𝑜𝑑 1000000 Eq. 4-2 
Where mod denotes the modulo operator, which finds the remainder of the division. 
The output 𝑇 consists of a 6-digit decimal key, which is what a user’s device 
ultimately uses for authentication. 
3. The token is translated via shifting and multiplying by constants. Translation is 
performed as follows: 
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 𝑇𝑠 =  𝑎 ∗  𝑇 +  𝑏 Eq. 4-3 
Where T is the token derived at step 2,𝑎 and 𝑏 are 6-digit integers. The length of 𝑎 
and 𝑏 are constrained by the size limit of the SSID field (32 characters). The length of 
𝑇𝑠 varies depending on 𝑎, 𝑇, and 𝐵. This step helps mitigate attackers who do not 
have client software installed on their device. Without knowledge of the translation 
constants, attackers will not be able to decipher token values; consequently, attackers 
will not be able to generate verifiable location proofs. More details about this are 
discussed in the next chapter. 
4. The translated token is encoded to base 64, generating 𝑇𝑏. This final token is 
ultimately broadcasted by the access point along with the header, which consists of 
fixed characters, so the user’s device can identify token broadcasts. Base 64 encoding 
output size depends on the input size; it merely assures that whatever is encoded can 
be represented entirely with printable characters (a requirement of the SSID field). 
4.3.1.1.2 Case 2: The access points do not have access to a time server 
In this case, the access points have no access to a time server. Thus, a counter is 
used to generate the tokens. A counter is started at the exact same time in the 
participating access points and the authorization entity, which is done by initially 
synchronizing the access point and the authorization entity when setting up the system 
before starting a counter. The counters ensure that the participating access points are in 
synchronization with the authorization entity. More details about restoring 
synchronization if faults occur are discussed later in this chapter. Figure 4-6 illustrates the 
token generation process in the absence of a time server: 
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Figure 4-6: The token generation process in case the access points have no access to a 
time server. 
1. Using the counter and the pre-shared secret, the HMAC function generates a code 
using the following equation: 





 H is a cryptographic hash function. The SHA256 hash function is used in the 
proposed system. 
 𝑐 is the counter value, which is obtained from the local clock of the access point in 
the format of YYYYMMDDHHmm, where YYYY is the 4-digit year, MM is the 
two-digit month, DD is the two-digit day of the month, HH is the two-digit hour (in 
24-hour format), and mm is the two-digit minute. An example of a counter value can 
be “201903251109”. 
k is the pre-shared secret, which is in ASCII text form.  
∥ denotes concatenation. 
 ⊕ denotes bitwise exclusive or (XOR). 
 𝑜 is the outer padding, consisting of the repeated bytes 0x5c (up to the block size). 
 𝑖 is the inner padding, consisting of the repeated bytes 0x36 (up to the block size). 
This function outputs a code 𝐾ℎ, that consists of 32 bytes. 
2. Similarly, a 6-digit decimal key is generated from the HMAC function output 
following Equation 4-2. The output 𝑇 consists of a 6-digit decimal key, which is what 
the user ultimately uses for authentication. 
3. The token T is concatenated with the synchronization parameter, which is the local 
time in DDHHmmSS format, where DD is the two-digit day of the month, HH is the 
two-digit hour (in 24-hour format), mm is the two-digit minute, SS is the two-digit 
second: 
 𝑇𝑐 = 𝑇||𝑆 Eq. 4-5 
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Where 𝑇𝑐 is the token after adding the counter information, 𝑇 is the token generated 
in Step 3, 𝑆 is the synchronization parameter in DDHHmmSS format, which is used 
to restore synchronization with the authorization entity. 
4. 𝑇𝑠is translated via shifting by a constant and multiplying by another constant 
following Equation 4-3. 
5. The translated token is encoded in base 64, generating 𝑇𝑏. This final token is 
broadcasted by the access point along with the header, which consists of fixed 
characters, so the user’s device can identify token's broadcasts. 
The access point transmits a base 64 representation of the token after the SSID 
header. The SSID header consists of three fixed ASCII characters, and it is used to 
declare that this Wi-Fi interface is used for broadcasting tokens; consequently, the user's 
device scans and identifies this interface using the SSID header, and then extracts tokens 
from these broadcasts. The access points transmit this information utilizing the SSID 
field of the beacon frame. The DD-WRT access point firmware allows modification of 
the SSID field. For our experiments, custom software was created to modify the SSID 
field to include the token. This process involves: (1) generating the token; (2) replacing 
the SSID field in the beacon frame with the token; and (3) restarting the interface to apply 
the new beacon information. This process is done repeatedly by the access point every 
predefined period. This period is configured in participating access points and the 
authorization entity and is optimized in a way that fits the deployment the best. More 
details about this are discussed in the next chapter. 
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4.3.1.2 Access areas 
In the proposed system, access areas are areas where access to resources is 
granted. In general, access areas are defined by the coverage of the token transmitting 
access point with specific RSSI ranges, which are configured in the authorization entity. 
Figure 4-7 shows the projected shapes of access areas using one, two, and three token 
transmitting access points. 
 
Figure 4-7: Access areas shape using one, two, and three token transmitting access 
points. 
An access area's size can be modified using the accepted RSSI ranges of the 
access points in an access area. Since the vast majority of user devices in a typical 
application setting utilize very similar antennas (with similar power), RSSI ranges are 
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acceptable to denote access areas. As shown in Figure 4-8, an access area's size can be 
increased by accepting a wider range of RSSI values at the authorization entity. 
 
Figure 4-8: Access area size can be modified when using different RSSI ranges. 
The proposed system aims to use the current IEEE 802.11 infrastructure without 
adding any new hardware. This is one of its strengths. Thus, it allows using any number 
of access points to define an access area. However, in order to achieve precise access 
areas, it is recommended to use at least three access points to achieve localization as in 
[49], for example. 
The RSSI values in which access is granted in an access area can be collected 
manually, which is done by recording the RSSI values transmitted in the beacons of 
participating access points in each access area. This is clearly a manual (and likely time 
consuming) process; however, it is a one-time process. The same result can be achieved 
automatically, however, through crowdsourcing RSSI values in an area, which is done by 
utilizing the devices of trusted users to obtain RSSI values throughout a potential access 
area and using them to configure an access area’s accepted ranges at the authorization 
entity. 
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 After the RSSI values are collected in an access area, the ranges of accepted 
RSSIs for each area are sent to the authorization entity and subsequently used to 
configure the system. 
4.3.2 The User's Device 
In the proposed system, the user's device passively detects IEEE 802.11 beacon 
frames in order to extract the tokens stored in the SSID field to use as a location proof in 
the LBAC system. This is done by using custom designed client software that is installed 
on the user’s device. It also establishes a connection to the authorization entity to obtain 
access to requested resources. In our experiments, the client software is implemented 
using the Python programming language on a Raspberry Pi and uses the SSH protocol to 
communicate with the authorization entity. The client software is pre-configured with 
information related to the specifics of deployment. It must be distributed to users of the 
system (as is typical with LBS applications). The client software is pre-configured with 
the following: 
1. The SSID header, which is used to identify the token transmitting access points. In 
this research, three ASCII characters in the SSID field are used to declare that a Wi-Fi 
interface is used for token transmitting. 
2. The shifting and multiplication constants for each of the token transmitting access 
points in the system. These are necessary to rule out attackers who do not have access 
to the client software and attempt to connect to the authorization entity. More details 
about this are discussed in the next chapter. 
3. The authorization entity information. 
Below are the functions performed by the user's device in the proposed system: 
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4.3.2.1 Obtaining a location proof 
The client software is preconfigured with the SSID header that is used to identify 
the access points that are broadcasting the tokens that are needed for creating the location 
proof. For each of the access points, the user's device extracts the broadcasted tokens as 
shown in Figure 4-9: 
1. When the user is inside an access area, the client software imports the pre-configured 
parameters for the deployment (which includes the SSID header, and the shifting and 
multiplication constants). 
2. The user's device scans for IEEE 802.11 access points in range. It then extracts the 
SSID, the MAC address, and the RSSI values of the relevant access points. 
3. The user's device decodes the base 64 token from the SSID field, yielding 𝑇𝑠. 
4. The user's device applies the proper shifting and multiplication constants to retrieve 




 Eq. 4-6 
Where 𝑇𝑠 is the translated token, and 𝑎 and 𝑏 are 6-digit integers. 
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Figure 4-9: The process of extracting the tokens from access points broadcasts by the 
user's device. 
In case a counter is used instead of the timestamp as in 4.1.1.12, then 𝑇𝑐 is 




 Eq. 4-7 
Where 𝑇𝑠 is the translated token, and 𝑎 and 𝑏 are 6-digit integers. 
5. The mobile device creates the location proof using equation 3-1. In case a counter is 









 𝐿𝑃(𝑐) is the location proof derived using the value of the counter 𝑐. 
 | | denotes concatenation. 
 𝑛 is the number of access points used for a specific access area. 
 𝑇𝑘𝐴𝑃𝑖 is the deobfuscation of the obfuscated token broadcasted by the access 
point 𝐴𝑃𝑖. 
 𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐴𝑃𝑖 is the RSSIs measured at the user's device for access point 𝐴𝑃𝑖. 
𝑐𝐴𝑃𝑖 is the counter value broadcasted by access point 𝐴𝑃𝑖. 
4.3.2.2 Connecting to the authorization (and obtaining access to a resource) 
The custom LBAC client software installed on the user's device automatically 
connects to the authorization entity in order to authenticate and subsequently obtain 
access to resources. The proposed system can be configured to use single-factor 
authentication (i.e., just a location proof) or multiple-factor authentication (e.g., a 
password along with the location proof). Adding a password as an extra authentication 
factor does not impact the performance since the user is prompted for the password only 
once when the SSH session is initiated; however, it adds an extra layer of security [54]. In 
our experiments, the SSH protocol is used to connect to the authorization entity. Figure 4-
10 illustrates two-factor authentication on the client software at the user's device: 
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Figure 4-10: The client software operation. 
As can be seen in the figure, the location proof is automatically obtained from 
nearby access point scans. After access is granted, the user's device continues to scan for 
tokens and generates location proofs. These are continually sent to the authorization 
entity in order to maintain access to requested resources. This can effectively result in 
continuous authentication. The frequency in which the user's device sends the new 
location proofs is discussed in the next chapter. 
4.3.3 The Authorization Entity 
The authorization entity is tasked with identifying the user's access area, verifying 
user credentials, and applicably authorizing access to resources. Section 4.3.3.1 covers 
the token generation process at the authorization entity, Section 4.3.3.2 explains the 
process of identifying the user's access area, Section 4.3.3.3 covers authentication factor 
verification and authorizing access to resources, Section 4.3.3.4 discusses 
synchronization, Section 4.3.3.5 discusses continuous authentication, and Section 4.3.3.6 
discusses access policy implementation. 
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4.3.3.1 Token generation 
As discussed in previous sections, the authorization entity and the participating 
access points share a pre-shared secret that they use to derive tokens simultaneously and 
periodically. The authorization entity generates all of the participating access point tokens 
locally in the two cases discussed earlier (i.e., when the access points have access to a 
time server and when they use a counter for synchronization). Below are the details for 
token generation at the authorization entity for the two cases: 
4.3.3.1.1 Case 1: The access points have access to a time server 
In this case, the access points and the authorization entity have access to a time 
server, and they use it to synchronize time. Figure 4-11 shows the token generation 
process, which is as follows: 
1. Using a timestamp and the pre-shared secret, the HMAC function generates a code 
following Equation 4-1. This equation outputs the code 𝐾ℎ, which consists of 32 
bytes. 
2. Similar to the access points, the authorization entity generates a 6-digit decimal key 
from the HMAC function following Equation 4-2. 
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Figure 4-11: The token generation process at the authorization entity in the case the 
that access points have access to a time server. 
4.3.3.1.2 Case 2: The access points do not have access to a time server 
In this case, the access points have no access to a time server. Thus, they use a 
counter to generate the tokens. As previously discussed, the counter at the access points is 
initially synchronized with the one at the authorization. The counter at the access points 
must be always synchronized with the one at the authorization entity. This is done by 
utilizing the synchronization parameter broadcasted by the access points. More details 
about maintaining synchronization between the access points and the authorization entity 
is discussed later in this chapter. Figure 4-12 shows the token generation process, which 
is as follows: 
1. Using the counter and the pre-shared secret, the HMAC function generates a code 




Figure 4-12: The token generation process at the authorization entity in the case that 
the access points do not have access to a time server. 
2. The authorization entity generates a 6-digit decimal key from the HMAC function 
following Equation 4-2. 
4.3.3.2 Access area identification 
In the proposed system, the access area selection process is done automatically by 
the authorization entity. As previously mentioned, the client software is configured with 
SSID header of the token transmitting access points, and it scans and sends all relevant 
access point information to the authorization entity. As shown in Equation 3-1, the 
authorization entity determines the access area as follows: 
1. The authorization entity compares MAC addresses of the token transmitting access 
points for each access area with the MAC addresses scanned and sent by the user's 
device. This returns the possible access areas. 
2. As previously discussed, the accepted RSSI ranges of each access point in all access 
areas are stored at the authorization entity. Consequently, by looping through the 
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possible access areas returned from Step 1, the authorization entity checks if the 
received RSSIs from the user’s devices fall in the accepted RSSI ranges of any of 
these access areas. This is done by comparing the RSSI received from the user’s 
device for each access point in a specified access area with the RSSI range stored at 
the authorization entity for each access point in same access area. Then, if all the 
RSSIs received from the user’s devices fall in the ranges of the ones stored at the 
authorization entity, the access area is selected. 
3. If no matching access area is found, authentication fails. 
Access area selection is the first step of authentication. A failure in determining a 
user's location results in authentication failure. Furthermore, access area selection is 
essential for the verification of the location proof and authorizing access to resources as 
discussed in the next subsection. 
4.3.3.3 The verification of the location proof 
In our experiments, the SSH protocol was utilized for communication between a 
user's device and the authorization entity. Therefore, authentication was performed 
utilizing SSH. Most Linux operating systems support Pluggable Authentication Modules 
(PAM) that provide dynamic authentication support for applications and services in a 
Linux environment. PAM allows configuring the number and the nature of authentication 
factors. In our experiments, control of SSH authentication is transferred to the PAM 
library and is configured to perform two-factor authentication (a password and the 
location proof).  
Location proof verification is done by linking the PAM configuration file to the 
token generation script (discussed previously) when an access request is received from a 
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user. The user's credentials are subsequently verified: the user's password is first verified; 
then, the location proof sent by the user's device is compared to the one generated locally. 
Access to resources is granted when a valid password and location proof are presented by 
the user. In our experiments, the resources are modeled by an SSH session. 
4.3.3.4 Synchronization 
Because the proposed system uses time-based tokens, it is essential to maintain 
synchronization between the access points and the authorization entity so that they can 
generate the same time-based token. This subsection covers synchronization. 
4.3.3.4.1 When the access points have access to a time server 
In this case, the participating access points and the authorization entity have 
access to a time server; therefore, they are all synchronized. However, it is important to 
configure both nodes to synchronize with the timeserver frequently to avoid losing 
synchronization, which can be done by using the proper clock synchronization protocol. 
For example, Network Time Protocol (NTP) regularly polls a group of time servers and 
keeps the system clock in synch from moment to moment [47].  
4.3.3.4.2 When the access points do not have access to a time server 
As previously discussed, the authorization entity has a counter running for each of 
the access points in the system. When access points do not have access to a time server, 
restoring synchronization is done by using the value of the counter broadcasted by the 
token transmitting access point. In the proposed system, every time a location proof is 
sent from a device that is granted access to the authorization entity, the value of the 
counter is stored in the last_admitted_counter parameter: a parameter that 
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stores the value of the counter received from a device that was previously granted access 
to resources. Restoring synchronization is done as follows: 
1. If an invalid location proof is received from the user's device, the authorization entity 
compares the value of the received location proof with the value of the location 
proofs that are generated using previous counters (starting from the current counter 
decrementing until the last_admitted_counter) 
2. If a match is found, the authorization entity updates the local counter with the counter 
embedded in the location proof. This restores the synchronization between the access 
point that was out of sync and the authorization entity. Then, access is granted. 
3. If no match is found, access is denied. 
4.3.3.5 Continuous authentication 
As previously mentioned, the proposed system provides continuous authentication 
with zero effort from the user, which is done by having the user's device continuously 
send location proofs to the authorization entity for verification. The authorization entity 
continuously checks the location proofs received from a user's device and accordingly 
makes access decisions. 
There are two timing parameters in the continuous authentication portion of the 
authorization entity: a timeout and a check period. The timeout represents the time that 
the authorization entity waits before verifying the user's credential again if the first 
authentication attempt fails. The purpose of using the timeout is to overcome any failures 
at the user's device or the access points by giving them another chance to present valid 
credentials. The check period parameter is the period that determines how often the 
authorization entity checks for the latest credentials provided by the user's device and 
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terminate the session if invalid ones are received. The pseudocode below describes how 
the authorization entity continuously verifies the location proof sent by a user’s device. 
while true: 
if location_proof_local != location_proof_received: 
      sleep timeout 
      if location_proof_local!=location_proof_received: 
          kill ssh_session(user) 
sleep check_ period 
As seen from the pseudocode, the authorization entity compares the latest location 
proof received from the user's device (location_proof_received) with the 
location proof generated locally (location_proof_local). If they do not match, the 
authorization entity waits through the timeout and checks again after the timeout period 
expires. If these values are still not equal after the timeout, the authorization entity 
terminates the user’s session. In our experiment, SSH is used for connection between the 
user’s device and the authorization entity. Thus, terminating the user’s session is done by 
killing the process of the SSH session for that user. The check_period specified in 
the pseudocode is the period in which the authorization entity waits before checking for 
the location proof again. Figure 4-13 shows the authorization entity system logs for the 
continuous authentication of a user. 
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Figure 4-13: The system logs for terminating the session of a user leaving the access 
area. 
As can be seen in the figure, the authorization entity verifies the user’s location 
proof every 60 seconds. Moreover, when the user did not send a valid location proof, the 
authorization entity took a 60-second timeout before verifying the user’s location proof 
again. Then, the user’s session was terminated due to the user failing to send a valid 
location proof. 
4.3.3.6 Access policy 
The goal of the access policy is to grant different access rights to different users. 
Access rights are the permissions a user holds to read, write, modify, delete, or access a 
resource (such as a file). Since SSH is used for authentication in the proposed system, it 
is possible to configure PAM to take some actions prior to authorization (e.g., mounting a 
drive). However, access policies can be specified in many ways for various connection 
methods to resources. Investigating other methods is a potentially interesting question for 
future research.  
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4.4 Experiments and Results 
In the previous section, we discussed the design specifics. This section presents a 
number of experiments that were utilized to test the proposed design. In the experiments, 
the following hardware was utilized: 
1. Access points: Netgear R6400 Wi-Fi access points. 
2. Authorization entity/resource server: Intel i5 and 8GB of RAM PC server with 
Ubuntu 18.10 (GNU/Linux 4.18.0-14-generic x86_64) as the operating system. 
3. User devices: in most of the experiments, Raspberry Pi with Raspbian 4.14.50-v7+ 
were used. However, different models of android smartphones were used in one 
experiment. Raspberry Pi was used as the user device in most of the experiments, due 
to the flexibility it offers, enabling much faster deployment, and it allows making 
changes on the fly, making it a great fit for experimental environments. 
Experiment 1 analyzed RSSI measurement consistency, while Experiment 2 
studied the differences in RSSI measurements between different models of user devices. 
Experiment 3 tested the access area's definition and performance, while Experiment 4 
tested the system's operation under different broadcast periods. Experiment 5 studied the 
effect of implementing various timeouts, and Experiment 6 tested the effect of token 
transmission on access point operation (i.e., resource usage). Finally, Experiment 7 tested 
the system's performance at the edges of access areas, and Experiment 8 studied the 
system's response when a user leaves an access area. 
4.4.1 Experiment1: RSSI Measurement Consistency 
In the proposed system, an access area is defined by the coverage of relevant 
access points. These access points combine to produce an RSSI footprint to define access 
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areas. In our experiments, a user device was placed in a fixed position inside the access 
area. This device recorded 15,000 RSSI values from an access point in range, with one 
reading recorded every 10 seconds. The results show that the recorded values are 
consistent with few anomalies. These anomalies happen for different reasons; for 
example, power source inconsistencies, signal obstruction, errors in readings, etc., which 
can cause instant inconsistent readings. Figure 4-13 shows the distribution of the 15,000 
recorded RSSIs. As can be seen in the figure, the distribution of the recorded RSSI values 
is consistent for most of the data. 
 
Figure 4-14: The distribution of the RSSIs of an access point recorded by a device. 
4.4.2 Experiment 2: Different Models Between Phones 
In this experiment, five different models of smartphones were placed next to each 
other. RSSI data was collected for an access point in range by the five smartphones. The 
results are shown in Table 4-1. 
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             Table 4-1: RSSI measurements for an access point using different models of 
smartphones. 
 
As can be observed from the results, the RSSI measurements are consistent across 
the different device models. More details about this are discussed in the next chapter. 
4.4.3 Experiment 3: Access Area Definition and Performance 
In this experiment, as shown in Figure 4-14, two devices were placed in 
neighboring offices with three access points in range. These devices recorded all tokens 
broadcasted by the access points along with their RSSI values. This was done twice: first, 
with the access points operating at the 2.4 GHz frequency; second, with the access points 
operating at the 5 GHz frequency. A total of 20,000 RSSI values were recorded for each 
frequency. The distribution of the recorded data in this experiment is presented in Tables 
4-2 and 4-3. 
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Figure 4-15: Experiment 3 setup. 
      Table 4-2: The distribution of the recorded RSSIs of the tokens broadcasted by the access points 




Table 4-3: The distribution of the recorded RSSIs of the tokens broadcasted by the access points                                                       
aaaaaaaa(at 5 GHz). 
 
As seen from Table 4-2, the data shows that setting the accepted range of RSSI 
values in access area Office 1 for AP1 to -24 to -42 dBm, for AP2 to -17 to -41 dBm, and 
for AP3 to -17 to -37 dBm results in more than 99% successful authentication for User 1 
claiming to be located in Office 1 (the intended access area for User 1). However, these 
ranges result in more than 99% authentication failures for User 2 claiming to be located 
in Office 1. These percentages are calculated by analyzing the data received from the 
user's device at the authorization entity. This can be visualized in Figure 4-15, which 
shows the probability of each RSSI value of access point AP3 to occur at User1 and 
User2 locations. As can be seen from the figure, the RSSI measurements for each user 
fall at a different range for most of the measurements. 
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Figure 4-16: The probability of RSSI measurements of access point 3 occurrences at 
User1 and User2 locations. 
Similarly, for the data shown in Table 4-3, setting the accepted range of RSSI 
values in Office 1 for AP1 to -18 to -31 dBm, for AP2 to -41 to -58 dBm, and for AP3 to 
-39 to -50 dBm results in more than 99% successful authentication for User 1 claiming to 
be located in Office 1 (the intended access area for User 1). However, these ranges result 
in more than 99% authentication failures for User 2 claiming to be located in Office 1. 
These percentages are calculated by analyzing the data received from the user's device at 
the authorization entity 
As can be observed from the recorded data, the 2.4 GHz access points seem to 
have greater RSSI values when compared to the 5 GHz access points. As discussed in 
chapter 1, this is because the traveling signal path loss is greater for higher frequencies. 
Accordingly, lower frequency wireless signals have more range, while higher frequency 
signals do not penetrate solid objects like walls and floors as well as lower frequency 
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signals. Thus, using the 5 GHz band for token transmission in the proposed system will 
give better results in terms of limiting access to resources to specific access areas. 
4.4.4 Experiment 4: Modulating Broadcast Period 
The goal of this experiment is to find an acceptable working broadcast period. In 
this experiment, different broadcast periods were tested: every 20 seconds, every 30 
seconds, and every minute. The user's device was then configured to collect tokens 
broadcasted using these periods. As can be seen in Table 4-4, when a new token was 
broadcasted every 20 seconds, the user’s device failed to obtain the new tokens 9.6% of 
the time. Moreover, when a new token was broadcasted every 30 seconds, the user's 
device failed to obtain a new token 1.9% of the time. However, when the period was s set 
to one minute, the user's device failed to obtain a new token only 0.6% of the time. 
Table 4-4: System’s performance for different broadcast periods. 
 
As can be seen from the results, the higher the token generation frequency, the 
greater the chance that the user's device will fail to obtain a new token. This occurs due to 
a number of reasons; for example, scan failures at the network interface of the user's 
device (these sometimes occur) or, more likely, when the user's device scans for 
broadcasts during the time that an access point's network interface is restarted to apply 
the new token. In general, increasing the token generation frequency increases the 
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chances for these errors to occur. In real settings, a balance between incorrect RSSI 
readings and how long a user can exit an access area while still being considered when it 
must be made. For our experiments, we used 60 seconds as the broadcast period, which 
we consider to be reasonable in a real-world implementation. This would mean that, in 
the worst case, a user could maintain access for up to 60 seconds after exiting an access 
area. 
4.4.5 Experiment 5: Access Point Operation 
In this experiment, access to production networks was tested while access points 
were broadcasting tokens in order to evaluate the impact of token generation on the 
access points. Specifically, we instructed the access points to send a ping (a tool to test 
the reachability of a host on a network) to test connection continuity and the potential 
impact of restarting the wireless network interface to apply a new SSID representing a 
new token. An IP address on the same network as the access points was accessed 10,000 
times while the access points were simultaneously transmitting tokens. Moreover, the 
same experiment occurred with token generation and transmission turned off (to form a 
comparison). The results are shown in Figure 4-16. 
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Figure 4-17: Ping statistics, when the token transmitting function was off (top) and on 
(bottom). 
As observed, there is slightly more packet loss (which occurs when a transmitted 
packet fails to arrive at their destination) when the token transmitting function is on. For 
example, packet loss was 37/10,000 (0.37%) with token generation turned off while it 
was 90/10,000 (0.90%) when the token generation was turned on. This happens because 
the interface is restarted so that the new settings (i.e., change the SSID field of the beacon 
frame to reflect the newly generated token) take effect every time a new token is 
generated. 
Another experiment was also conducted to test the effect of token transmission on 
access point operations. In this experiment, a large file was downloaded from a local 
server using the file transfer protocol (FTP), which is a standard network protocol used 
for the transfer of computer files between a client and server on a computer network. The 
large file was downloaded while the token generation was functional. We also tested this 
with the token generation turned off. As can be seen from the results shown in Figure 4-
17, the download speed of the large file was two seconds faster when the token 
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generation was turned off with a similar transmission rate of 3.75 MB/s. However, as can 
be seen from the experiments, there is no major impact on network performance when the 
token transmitting function is on, as running the token generation function on the router 
only caused 0.53% additional packet loss and 0.25% slowdown in transmission speed. 
 
Figure 4-18: FTP download time with and without token transmitting function. 
4.4.6 Experiment 6: Timeouts 
The device was configured to collect the tokens and the RSSI values of three 
access points. These access points were configured to transmit a new token every 60 
seconds, and consequently, data points were collected every 60 seconds. A total of 
10,000 data points were collected. During this time, the user's device could not obtain a 
token 40 times (0.4% of the time). Ultimately, this is a small percentage. When a timeout 
is implemented at the authorization entity for when a user device fails to send the latest 
token, these failures only cause two session terminations. Furthermore, when two 
consecutive timeouts are implemented, these failures do not cause any session 
terminations. As seen in Experiment 4, it is highly unlikely for the user’s device to fail in 
generating and sending a location proof if it is still inside the access area. 
4.4.7 Experiment7: Edges 
In this experiment, as illustrated in Figure 4-18, a user's device was placed at the 
edge of an access area inside an office; 2,000 data points were subsequently collected. 
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The user's device was then placed immediately outside the office (behind a wall – to 
imitate an attacker), and another 2,000 data points were collected. The goal of this 
experiment was to test the ability of attackers standing at the edge of an access area to 
attempt to obtain access to resources by claiming to be inside an access area (when they 
are not). Table 4-5 shows the distribution of RSSI readings for the user and the attacker. 
 
Figure 4-19: Experiment 7 setup. 
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Table 4-5: The distribution of RSSI readings for the user and the attacker. 
 
As can be seen in the results, it is sufficient if RSSI ranges to obtain access inside 
the office are configured from -55 dBm to -44 dBm for AP1, from -51 dBm to -44 dBm 
for AP2, and from -23 dBm to -29 dBm for AP3.These values were set by measuring the 
RSSIs immediately outside the access area and setting RSSI values to thwart attackers. 
Thus, an attacker claiming to be inside the access area will fail to get access to resources 
at least 95% of the times. Furthermore, limiting the number of permitted connection 
attempts will decrease the attacker chances to gain access even more, as it prevents 
connection attempts from a user after many authentication failures. 
4.4.8 Experiment 8: Users Leaving the Access Area 
The goal of this experiment is to test if user sessions are terminated once an 
access area is exited. In this experiment, the token generation period was set to 60 
seconds. Furthermore, the user exited the access area 100 times after the first successful 
authenticating in the access area. In the experiment, 50 trials were done without 
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activating the timeout function discussed in section 4.3.3.5, while the remaining 50 trials 
were performed with a 30-second timeout. As can be seen in Table 4-6, the system 
achieved a 100% success rate in terminating the user's session once the access area was 
exited. Timeout column represents the number of timeouts implemented. Average time to 
terminate represents the average time it took the authorization entity to terminate the 
user’s session after leaving the access area for all the attempts. The last column 
represents the maximum time it took the authorization entity to terminate the user’s 
session after leaving the access area. 
Table 4-6: Authorization entity response to users leaving an access area. 
 
4.5 Example Scenario 
In this section, we discuss an example scenario. In this scenario, three token 
transmitting access points are used in an access area. As seen in Figure 4-19, three token 
transmitting access points are used. As previously discussed, the user’s device collects 
the tokens and uses them to derive a location proof that is later used to authenticate with 
the authorization entity. In this section, we discuss what happens at each of the nodes. 
Note that we assume that the access points have access to a time server. thus, a timestep 
is used in the token generation. 
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Figure 4-20: The scenario setup. 
At the access points: 
As previously discussed, each access point generates tokens using a pre-shared 
secret and a timestamp by using Equation 4-1. For this example, the pre-shared secrets at 
AP1, AP2 and AP3 are “secret1”, “secret2”, and “secret3”, respectively. In this example 
scenario, the access points generate a new token every 60 seconds. As discussed in 
Section 4.3.1.1.1, each access point generates, translates, encodes, and finally transmits 
the token as follows: 
1. When access point AP1 executes, the HMAC function shown in Equation 4-1 using the 
pre-shared secret mentioned above and the timestamp “201903181043”, the output code 
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results in the following: 
f8651e2f6b5f9dfc3988a4d1b14e7ae0f4b0c6c7cb1014b8c37886871ae2a53c. 
2. The result obtained from step one is divided by 1,000,000, and the modulo of this 
division is calculated, which, in this case is 442,620. This is ultimately the token, which 
the user’s device uses in deriving a location proof. 
3. Next, this token is translated using addition and multiplication using the constants 
(296,772 and 215,415) as follows: 
 442,620 ∗ 296,772 + 215,415 =  131,357,438,055 
4. The translated token is converted to base 64 which yields 
MTMxMzU3NDM4MDU1Cg==. 
5.  Now, the access points add the header that allows the client software to recognize that 
this broadcast is actually a token, which in this example is “AP_”. 
6. Finally, the access point modifies the SSID field to MTMxMzU3NDM4MDU1Cg== and 
broadcasts the beacon frame. Similarly, AP2 and AP3 broadcast 
MTY4MzM4MTk2OTc1Cg== and MTkwNDcxNzQ5NTA3Cg== simultaneously. As 
can be seen from the access point broadcasts, despite using the same timestamp, the base 
64 values are different due to the unique pre-shared secrets used at each of the access 
points. 
At the user device: 
As previously mentioned, the client software is installed on the user’s device to 
handle location proof generation and connecting to the authorization entity. The client 
software generates the location proof as discussed in Section 4.3.2 and as follows: 
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1. The client software searches the Wi-Fi scan results for access points with the SSID 
starting with prefix “AP_” and returns the SSID, the MAC address, and the RSSI values 
of matching access points. In this example, this step returns 
AP_MjI3NTU3ODYyNDg3Cg==, AP_ Mzg5OTEyNDk2OTg0Cg==, and 
AP_NjUxMTQ2OTQ1OTc2Cg== along with their RSSIs and MAC addresses.  
2. The client software truncates the SSID to get the encoded token translation. Then, the 
client software decodes the encoded token translation from base 64 to obtain the 
translated token. 
3. As previously discussed, the translation constants are securely stored in the client 
software. The client software uses these constants to de-translate output to retrieve the 
original token, as follows: 
131,357,438,055 − 215,415
296,772
 =  442,620 
Similarly, tokens are deobuscated for AP2 and AP3 to 567,230 and 641,811. 
4. The client software generates the location proof using Equation 3-1. In this example, 
RSSIs for AP1, AP2 and AP3 are -45 dBm -44, dBm, and -40 dBm respectively. The 
result is as follows: 
A0:04:60:75:D8:7D442620-45A0:04:60:75:D8:FD567230-44A0:04:60:75:D8:7E641811-40 
5. Finally, the client software uses the location proof along with a password to authenticate 
with the authorization entity over a secure channel. In case access is granted, the user 
device sends a new location proof continuously, every period.  
At the authorization entity: 
As previously discussed, the authorization entity is responsible for verifying the 
user’s credentials and granting or denying the user access to resources. When the 
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authorization receives an access request from the user’s device, which includes the 
username, a password, and a location proof, the authorization entity verifies the 
password, then verifies the location proof as follows: 
1. Using the pre-shared secrets with the access points in the system, the authorization entity 
locally generates the same tokens generated by the access points in the system every 60 
seconds and stores them in a database. When using the timestamp “201903181043”, 
locally generated tokens of access points AP1, AP2, and AP3 are 442,620, 567,230, and 
641,811 respectively. 
2. The authorization entity receives a location proof from the user’s device in real time. 
Moreover, it is aware of the format of the location proof and it divides the location proof 
based on the pre-known indices. This returns the MAC addresses, the tokens, and the 
RSSIs of access points as follows: 
A0:04:60:75:D8:7D | 442620 | -45 | A0:04:60:75:D8:FD | 567230 | -44 | A0:04:60:75:D8:7E |  641811|  -40.  
𝑀𝐴𝐶𝐴𝑃1  |𝑇𝑘𝐴𝑃1|𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐴𝑃1 |𝑀𝐴𝐶𝐴𝑃2  |𝑇𝑘𝐴𝑃2|𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐴𝑃2 |𝑀𝐴𝐶𝐴𝑃3  |𝑇𝑘𝐴𝑃3|𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐴𝑃3 
3. Using the information returned from Step 2, the authorization entity identifies the access 
area following the steps discussed in Section 4.3.3.2. 
4. The authorization entity compares the token received versus the one generated locally. 
Moreover, it verifies if the received RSSIs fall in range of the previously configured 
ranges of the specified access area. If the received location proof is valid, access is 
granted. Otherwise, access is denied. If access is granted, the authorization entity 
continues to check the newly sent location proofs and terminates the user’s session if 
invalid ones are received.  
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4.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, different elements of the system were discussed, including their 
functions and design requirements. Subsequently, design specifics of each of the 
elements were discussed, including software and hardware specifics. Furthermore, this 
chapter described the steps that the access points and the authorization entity undergo to 
generate a token based on the pre-shared secret (which was discussed in two scenarios: 
when the access points have access to a time server and when they do not). Subsequently, 
a discussion of the method utilized to verify location proofs at the authentication server 
was discussed, including performing continuous authentications and granting access 
based on specified access policy. In the next chapter, the proposed system will be 
analyzed, and strengths and weaknesses will be identified and discussed. Furthermore, 










In the previous chapter, the design details of the proposed system were covered. 
In this chapter, the different aspects of the proposed system are evaluated based on the 
experiments performed. Moreover, the different factors and parameters that play a role in 
the proposed system's performance are analyzed. Section 5.1 analyzes the proposed 
system's security and its response to different types of attacks. Section 5.2 evaluates the 
proposed system from the point of view of user convenience. Section 5.3 discusses the 
steps taken to ensure the robustness of the system. Section 5.4 provides a discussion of 
access policies. Section 5.5 summarizes the proposed system’s deployment estimated 
costs to better gauge real-world implementation. We conclude in Section 5.6. 
5.1 Security 
In general, the main goal of employing multiple-factor authentication is to 
enhance the security of a system. For example, two-factor authentication adds an 
additional level of security in case the first authentication factor is compromised, making 
it harder for attackers to access systems with stolen passwords, for example. In our work, 
the additional authentication factor is intended to associate an authorization to use 
resources to the physical location of users to ensure that they can only access specific 
resources when they are physically located in a specific location. In this section, the 
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security features of the proposed system are analyzed, followed by a study of the system's 
response to different types of anticipated attacks. 
5.1.1 Security Features 
We will first examine the security features of the proposed system by analyzing 
how secure the tokens are generated using the HMAC function. Next, access areas are 
discussed. Finally, the continuous authentication feature in the proposed system is 
analyzed. 
5.1.1.1 Token security 
In the proposed system, tokens are generated using the HMAC function with a 
pre-shared secret along with the current time (or a counter). The SHA256 hash function is 
used, which is considered secure in a cybersecurity context. In fact, it is used by the 
Linux operating system for secure password hashing [18]. With current computational 
resources, it is nearly impossible to brute force a SHA256 hash to obtain the pre-shared 
secret. In general, HMAC is secure [9]. Furthermore, to enforce the token's security 
against attacks (e.g., a dictionary attack), tokens are altered (or translated) by performing 
various arithmetic operations before they are broadcasted in the beacon frame by 
participating access points. Only users with the client software are able to regenerate the 
original tokens since only the client software has access to the translation constants. 
Translation constants are stored securely in the client software (by using source code 
protection tools). Even though if attackers were able to retrieve the translation constant 
(e.g., by reverse engineering the client software), they still would need physical access to 
the access area, a valid username, and, if two-factor authentication is used, an additional 
authentication factor (such as a password). 
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5.1.1.2 Access areas 
For deployments with higher security requirements, accepted RSSI ranges can be 
set more narrowly to eliminate any chance of unauthorized users obtaining access to a 
protected resource from outside of a specified access area. In the experiments in the 
previous chapter, access points with omnidirectional antennas were used. An 
omnidirectional antenna radiates equal radio power in all directions. However, access 
areas can be tailored more accurately using directional antennas, which are designed to 
function more effectively in one specific physical direction. Moreover, shielding paint 
can be used to block the leakage of access point signals through walls, windows, doors, 
etc. Combining these strategies can result in more accurate delineation of access areas.  
5.1.1.3 Continuous authentication 
In the proposed system, continuous authentication is necessary. Continuous 
authentication ensures that users maintain access to resources only when they maintain 
their presence in specified access areas. This is done by having a user's device 
continuously send the location proof and requiring the authorization entity to 
continuously verify it. In the previous chapter, we experimented setting the broadcast 
period to different values (some experimental values resulted in stable system 
performance). However, the broadcast period depends on the deployment's needs. The 
goal of setting the token generation frequency interval (to, for example, every one, two, 
or five minutes) is continuous authentication to ensure that users will lose access to 
resources once they leave an access area. As seen in Experiment 8 in Chapter 4, the user's 
sessions were terminated successfully 100% of the time when the user left the access 
area. 
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5.1.2 Cyber-attack Vulnerability Assessment 
In this section, the proposed system’s vulnerability for some of the common 
cyber-attacks is assessed and discussed. These cyber-attacks were chosen by analyzing 
the possible threats on our proposed system and its components. Furthermore, the steps 
taken to minimize threats from these types of attacks are also discussed. Section 5.1.2.1 
focuses on eavesdropping, Section 5.1.2.2 focuses on man-in-the-middle attacks, section 
5.1.2.3 looks at attacks that attempt to gain unauthorized access to the access points, 
Section 5.1.2.4 discusses the wormhole attack, and Section 5.1.2.5 focuses on the relay 
attack. These are described below. 
5.1.2.1 Eavesdropping 
In this type of attack, an attacker eavesdrops on access point broadcasts in order 
to obtain tokens and use them to attempt to authenticate and gain access to a resource. In 
the proposed system, RSSI values are verified if they correspond to an access area. 
Access is denied if they do not. However, if an attacker is inside an access area, then the 
client software is necessary in order to successfully extract tokens from the broadcasts. 
Tokens can still be sniffed but attackers cannot make sense of them without the client 
software. In the case of two-factor authentication, the attacker will need a second 
authentication factor in order to be able to successfully obtain access to resources.  
5.1.2.2 The man-in-the-middle attack 
The man-in-the-middle attack occurs when an attacker is inserted in the system 
and secretly intercepts communication occurring within the system. Often, such an 
attacker transmits (and possibly even alters) communication between two parties who 
believe that they are directly communicating with each other. The result is an appearance 
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of normal communication. The case where an attacker is intercepting communication 
between access points and a user's device was discussed in the previous section. 
However, an attacker may also intercept the communication between the user's device 
and the authorization entity. In our experiments, the SSH protocol is utilized for 
communicating between a user's device and the authorization entity. This protocol is 
intrinsically secure and effectively thwarts man-in-the-middle attacks. In practice, 
however, SSH may not be the protocol that is utilized between users and the 
authorization server. Regardless, the protocol used may utilize standard asymmetric 
cryptography through a key exchange in order to mitigate man-in-the-middle attacks. 
5.1.2.3 Targeting the access points 
In this type of attack, an attacker aims to gain unauthorized access to the access 
points. The goal is for the attacker to compromise an access point and (potentially) obtain 
the pre-shared secret that is used to generate the tokens. An access point’s management 
console is typically protected using strong credentials (e.g., username and password). 
Nonetheless, it is still vulnerable. This type of attack can be minimized by disabling 
remote management on the access points. This requires direct physical access to the 
access points in order to manage them. Furthermore, it is possible to encrypt sensitive 
files stored on the access point. Hence, even in cases of unauthorized access, an attacker 
will not be able to obtain anything useful as it relates to potentially compromising our 
proposed LBAC system. Encryption of sensitive information on an access point can be 
done by using file encryption tools such as GNU Privacy Guard (GPG – on Linux). 
106 
5.1.2.4 The wormhole attack 
In the proposed system, a wormhole attack can occur when an attacker receives 
the broadcasts at a point inside the access area. To mount this attack, an attacker forwards 
broadcasts to a rogue device that is located outside of the access area and attempts to use 
the tokens to obtain access to resources when located outside of the access area. 
However, in our proposed system, this attack is only possible if the attacker has the client 
software installed, and is, therefore, able to obtain the tokens from the broadcasts. In 
general, wormhole attacks are a tricky problem in wireless networks. Despite the 
challenges in detecting and preventing wormhole attacks, such attacks are limited as the 
attacker needs physical access to the access area, needs the client software, and, if using 
two-factor authentication, an additional factor (such as a password). 
5.2 User Convenience 
Multi-factor authentication enhances the security of a system; however, it usually 
comes at the expense of user convenience. In the proposed system, the extra 
authentication factor does not compromise user convenience as it is automatically 
managed by the user's device. Therefore, continuous authentication occurs without any 
burden on the users of the system. This is the most significant strength of the proposed 
LBAC system. It does not require extra steps on the part of the user because the location 
proof is automatically extracted and sent to the authorization entity by the user's device. 
This is done by having the user's device scan in the background for participating access 
points, generate location proofs from those broadcasts, and send them to the authorization 
entity (repeatedly, ensuring continuous authentication). As seen from Experiment 5 in the 
previous chapter, the proposed system does not affect an access point's main function to 
107 
provide access to the network (if this is desired). That is, existing access points can be 
used to implement the proposed system without compromising their original intended 
purpose. During our experiments, the access points were used to obtain access to the 
Internet while generating and broadcasting tokens, with no observable negative side 
effects (e.g., poor performance). 
5.3 Robustness 
It is essential for an access control system to have robust operation since failures 
may potentially hinder a user’s ability to utilize the system. In this section, the steps taken 
in the proposed system to enhance its operational robustness are discussed. Section 5.3.1 
examines RSSI fluctuations and Section 5.3.2 covers synchronization loss. Finally, 
Section 5.3.3 analyzes the token generation frequency. 
5.3.1 RSSI Fluctuations 
Through various experiments, we observed that RSSI values are fairly consistent. 
However, anomalies sometimes appear. Because RSSI values are used in the 
authentication process, it is important to address these anomalies to prevent them from 
negatively affecting the system. Thus, a timeout is utilized to improve the system's 
robustness. In the case that an abnormal RSSI value is recorded, the authorization entity 
will go in a timeout state. It will then check the RSSI values again before terminating a 
user’s session. Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 4, multiple timeouts could increase the 
overall robustness of the system. An experiment showed that fewer service interruptions 
are encountered when using two timeouts than using one because providing more chances 
for users to present valid credentials decreases the chance of them being disconnected. 
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After testing multiple devices in Experiment 3 (in Chapter 4), results proved 
consistent with respect to RSSI values measured across different smartphones. This is 
due to the fact that the internal omnidirectional antennas of mobile phones are necessarily 
small. Thus, the gain value of small omnidirectional antennas is theoretically limited 
[16], and in practice does not exceed 5 dB. Gain values of 2 dB or 3 dB are common. 
Moreover, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has limits on Wi-Fi antennas 
gains [22]. This combines to effectively assure similar RSSI readings across typical 
mobile devices used by users in the proposed LBAC system. 
5.3.2 Losing Synchronization 
In the proposed system, tokens are generated at participating access points and at 
the authorization entity. The same tokens can only be generated if the access points and 
authorization entity are synchronized. As previously discussed, this can be achieved by 
using a timestamp or a counter. However, it is possible that synchronization is affected, 
for example, through power loss at either the access points or the authorization entity. 
Restoring synchronization is straightforwardly performed when using a timestamp to 
generate a token. On the other hand, as discussed in the previous chapter, synchronization 
when using a counter to generate a token is restored by embedding a synchronization 
parameter in the location proof, which is then used by the authorization entity to update 
the local counters so that they match the ones at the access points.  
5.3.3 Token Generation Frequency 
In the proposed system, new tokens are transmitted by the access points 
constantly to ensure that a user's device is still located in an access area. When access 
points transmit tokens, their wireless network interfaces are restarted. This forces a 
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change of the SSID (which contains the generated token) to take effect. The wireless 
network interface will be down for a short time, which will prevent a user's device from 
scanning for broadcasts from the access point. In Experiment 4 in the previous chapter, 
the frequency at which new tokens were generated was set to different values, and it was 
found that more robustness is achieved when setting frequency to at least one minute. 
Furthermore, as seen in Experiment 8 in the previous chapter, setting the frequency to 
one minute achieved a 100% success rate in terminating the users leaving the access area 
session in less than one minute. 
5.3.4 Access Point Operations 
The proposed system utilizes existing IEEE 802.11 infrastructure and adds a 
novel LBAC element; therefore, it is essential that it does not affect the existing 
functionality of the access points. As discussed earlier, the proposed system can create 
and use a virtual interface on each access point to transmit tokens. Thus, the physical 
interface can still be used for network access as usual. Moreover, access points with more 
than one operating frequency can devote one to the LBAC and others to normal 
networking operations. As shown in Experiment 5 in Chapter 4, configuring the access 
point to transmit tokens does not significantly impact the access point's functionality to 
provide access to the network. 
5.4 Cost 
Since the proposed system utilizes the existing IEEE 802.11 infrastructure, no 
new hardware is required. However, the access points used must support firmware 
upgrades so that advanced features can be enabled. This is typically supported in most 
mid-priced access points that can be purchased in the market today. 
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5.5 Location-based Policy 
Location-based access policies are mainly managed by the operating system of 
the server providing resources. Most operating systems allow configuring different access 
rights to different users. In the proposed system, SSH along with Linux PAM were 
utilized for the connection between the user's device and the authorization entity. Linux 
PAM allows integrating various access policy functionalities such as 
mounting/unmounting the user’s home directory and restricting/enabling the services 
available to the user. However, more advanced location-based access policies can be 
implemented using different operating systems, which can be a question for future 
research. 
5.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter, different aspects of the proposed system were evaluated. 
Moreover, different configurations and parameters that play a role in the proposed 
system's performance were examined, and the system’s response to the most common 
attacks was assessed. This chapter demonstrated that the proposed LBAC system is 
adequately secure, convenient, robust, inexpensive, highly configurable, and compatible 
with implementing access policies. The next chapter will summarize this work and 




CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
6.1 Conclusions 
LBSs are essential today. They are widely used for a variety of functions such as 
geo-tagging user-generated content on social media, locating nearby restaurants or 
ordering food, and obtaining a ride (e.g., using Uber and Lyft). They are also used by 
advertisers to target advertisements based on the location of their target market's 
demographics. This work illustrates an important application of LBS: securely 
controlling access to resources. Recently, it has become more significant since a large 
proportion of the population uses location-capable mobile devices. Thus, taking 
advantage of this capability for security applications has also become essential. People 
use these technologies every day for different functions (e.g., online banking, access 
control, etc.). LBAC is a security application of LBSs that manages access to resources 
by utilizing the physical location of users. This research proposes an LBAC system that 
attempts to take advantage of the current IEEE 802.11 infrastructure, making it directly 
applicable to the existing, widely used systems in a cost-effective and unobtrusive way 
for users of the system. 
Currently, there is relatively little research that addresses LBAC in an unobtrusive 
way for users. Most of the current work results in more involvement of users through 
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additional network connections or authentication steps. Inherently, this is inconvenient 
and can result in inconsistencies: fallible humans are actively involved. 
The majority of the research in LBAC addresses either location fixing or access 
control separately (i.e., no single research endeavor combines the two in an effective, 
unobtrusive manner). In order to build an efficient LBAC system, it is important to 
address both as a whole. Hence, providing a unified method to address location fixing 
and access control simultaneously and in a user convenient way is essential and 
important. 
This research studied the general LBAC architecture and the necessary 
characteristics that are required to provide an effective and secure LBAC system. 
Characteristics such as security, user convenience, robustness, and cost combine to 
produce an effective LBAC system when assured. The work in this dissertation presented 
a LBAC system design that satisfies the specified requirements. Analyzing and assessing 
the proposed system’s performance substantiated it to meet the design requirements, and 
showed that the proposed LBAC system is secure, convenient, robust, inexpensive, 
highly configurable, and compatible with implementing various access policies.  
The proposed work details a LBAC system in which a user’s location is 
continuously verified to provide a guarantee that the user can only access resources when 
physically present within a specified location. Furthermore, and quite importantly, this is 
done without any involvement from the users of the system. This work adds 
authentication factor that builds off of existing factors (e.g., username and password). 
The proposed system is cost-effective and can be directly implemented to the current 
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IEEE 802.11 infrastructure by simply modifying the software on the access points in 
place without necessarily requiring additional hardware. 
The proposed system supports location-based access policies, which means that 
the nature of resources granted to a user depends not only on the user's identity but also 
on the user's location. This allows limiting access to certain resources only when a user is 
present within a specific location. The proposed system is highly optimizable and allows 
different configurations that can be used to fine-tune the system to achieve the best result 
for a specific deployment. Since most of mobile devices in the market today are already 
location capable, having a secure, unobtrusive, inexpensive, robust, and optimizable 
LBAC system encourages the addition of the location element to the authentication 
process in more systems in the future.  
6.2 Future Work 
This research proposed a LBAC system that can be immediately deployed 
utilizing existing infrastructure. Hence, one future project can be a practical deployment 
of the proposed system. Below are some potential future projects: 
1- Exploring the different type of hardware and equipment that is supported by the 
proposed system. This includes experimenting with user devices such as Android and 
IOS smartphones and exploring the different types of resource servers such as web 
server, files servers, and so on. 
2- Implementing the proposed system in a corporate office setting, in which different 
users have different access permissions. Furthermore, implementing location-based 
access policies, in which access to specific resources is controlled by the user’s 
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location along with the user’s identity. For example, limiting access to sensitive 
resources when a user is inside a specific area. 
3- Implementing the proposed system in academic settings to automate the tracking of 
student attendance. A possible way to accomplish this is by modifying the Wi-Fi 
access points within the university infrastructure to broadcast tokens, utilizing the 
personal smartphones of students as user devices, and embedding the client software 
in the university's smartphone app. This can automate student attendance tracking. 
The research presented in this work has raised some additional interesting 
research questions. We envision several problems arising from this research that can be 
pursued as future work. The following potential research topics related to this work could 
be pursued in the future: 
1. The potential for using a smartphone as a key to obtain access to another device by 
configuring the smartphone to transmit tokens based on a pre-shared secret. This can 
be done by taking advantage of the IEEE 802.11 interface within the smartphone, and 
by using the “hotspot” function available in most smartphones. By utilizing the same 
concept of periodic token broadcast, a user could maintain access to a resource only 
when the smartphone is proximate. 
2. The potential for using cellular network infrastructure as opposed to (or in addition 
to) IEEE 802.11 to expand the proposed system. In this way, tokens are broadcasted 
by taking advantage of the broadcast channels in cellular technologies (e.g., GSM, 
UMTS, LTE, and 5G). This would allow implementing vast access areas that can 
cover larger areas such as streets and neighborhoods. 
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3. The possibility of taking advantage of the ability of access points to control 
transmitted power and use variable power transmission patterns to verify that a user is 
receiving the signal directly from the access point (and, for example, not through a 
repeater which could be indicative of a man-in-the-middle attack). This could further 
address relay and wormhole attacks. 
This research presents a methodology to build an LBAC system using the current 
IEEE 802.11 infrastructure. Through this work, interesting problems have been 
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